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GROUNDS AND DEFENSES TO DIVORCE
IN PENNSYLVANIA
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since 1929 there has been no major revision in Pennsylvania divorce
law.' Reform legislation has, however, recently been introduced in the
Pennsylvania legislature in an attempt to bring the existing laws into
harmony with the realities of the 1960's. The purpose of this Comment
is to examine the law in Pennsylvania, as it pertains to the grounds and
defenses available in divorce proceedings, and to evaluate the proposed
changes in light of the weaknesses of the present system. Initially the
existing grounds and defenses will be examined individually. Subsequent
examination will focus on the fault principle and whether there is injury
to the innocent spouse, the factors which underlie the present grounds
and defenses. Particular attention will be paid to the success of these
factors in fulfilling the state's interest in maintaining the stability of
individual marriages. Finally the proposed legislative changes will be
examined, compared to, and evaluated with the law as it presently exists
in order to ascertain where legislative reform is necessary.
II.

GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE

A divorce proceeding has often been referred to as a three party
action involving the state as well as the husband and wife. 2 In large
measure, this approach stems from the ecclesiastical origin of divorce law,
with its emphasis on the immorality of divorce.8 Today, while religiousmoral pressure is a strong factor in the rigidity of divorce laws, the
state's involvement seems to be predicated on the secular belief that only
through marriage can stable sexual relations be maintained, proper training
4
of children be accomplished, and a well-ordered society be sustained.
To protect these interests the state allows a divorce only where one
spouse has committed a "crime" against the other. These "crimes" or
grounds for divorce are in reality, based on the idea that one of the
1. Act of May 2, 1929, Pub. L. 1237, PA. STAT. tit. 23, §§ 1-69 (1965). Minor
amendments were enacted in subsequent years but their effect has been mainly procedural. For a complete history of the divorce law of Pennsylvania see A. FREEDMAN
& M. FREEDMAN, LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DrVoRcE IN PENNSYLVANIA 248 (2d ed. 1957)
[hereinafter cited as FREEDMAN]. For a succinct summary of the history of divorce

law in Western Civilization see Freed & Foster, Divorce American Style, 383 THE
ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 71 (1969).
2. See, e.g., Teriberry v. Teriberry, 210 Pa. Super. 54, 232 A.2d 201 (1967);
Staffieri v. Staffieri, 197 Pa. Super. 443, 179 A.2d 663 (1962); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 32
Leh. L.J. 45 (1966). See also Freed, Defenses Against Divorce in French and American Law, 38 TEXAS L. REv. 303 (1960).
3. See Freed & Foster, supra note 1, at 72.
4. Broadway, Collusion and the Public Interest in the Law of Divorce, 47
CORNELL L.Q. 374, 384 (1962). See Hammer, Divorce Reform in California: The
Governor's Commission on the Family and Beyond, 9 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 32,
41 (1968).
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parties to the marriage is to blame or is at "fault." They are also implicitly
rationalized by the fact that the non-culpable party has been so seriously
injured that the viability of the marriage has been destroyed.
There are presently six main grounds for divorce a.v.m. :5 bigamy,
conviction and sentence for a crime, adultery, desertion, cruel and
barbarous treatment, and indignities to the person.6 They are subject
to the qualification that the party seeking the divorce be an "innocent and
injured spouse," thereby preventing a dissolution of marriage whenever
the conduct of the libellant has precipitated the marital offense. 7 This
section of the Comment will focus on the situations which are required
to invoke each of these statutory grounds and on how well these grounds
further the state's interest in the stability of the "marriage contract."
A.

Bigamy

Divorce is available on the grounds of bigamy to an innocent and
injured spouse where the other has knowingly entered into a second
marriage.8 It has been extended, by statute, to the situation where a
spouse has remarried on an apparently well-founded rumor of his mate's
death even though the act of bigamy is not a knowing one. 9 It is interesting to note that while divorce on the ground of bigamy is available to
5. Divorce a.v.m., a vinculo matrimonii, is a complete dissolution of a marriage
and must be distinguished from divorce a.m.t., a mensa et thoro, divorce from bed and
board, which is a legal senaration available only to the wife. See pp. 165-66 infra.
The latter remedy to the problem of settling marital discord was the historical
precedent of the former and reflects the early ecclesiastical distaste for divorce. See
Freed & Foster, supra note 1, at 73.
6. There are four grounds for divorce which will not be treated in this Comment: physical incapacity or impotence; fraud; duress; and incest. The reasons for
these omissions are the relative lack of importance of these grounds, the fact that all
but incest pertain to the intent of the parties to get married, and the obvious import
of their requirements. It is sufficient to note that the first reflects the state's belief that
the purpose of marriage is procreation; the second and third reflect a lack of intention to marry; the last reflects the moral distaste for marriage within families and
the fear of genetically defective children; and they all reflect the state's preference
for divorce over annulment. For a detailed review of these grounds see FREEDMAN,
supra note 1, at 336-418. The new proposal would make them grounds for annulment.
JOINT STATE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION, PROPOSED MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE CODE IVOR
PENNSYLVANIA § 303, at 36-37 (1961).
This is actually a compilation of separate

divorce and marriage codes which will hereinafter be cited as PROPOSED MARRIAGE
CODE or PROPOSED DIVORCE CODE as appropriate. See Comment, Pennsylvania Common
Law Marriage and Annulment: Present Law and Proposals for Reform, 15 VILL. L.
REv. 134, 143-49 (1969), for a discussion of these grounds.
7. Since the state only grants divorce where its own interests are outweighed,
and since the state has historically frowned on divorce, it is to be expected that the
state would refuse to grant relief to those at fault themselves. See pp. 167-68 infra
for a complete discussion of this doctrine.
8. PA. STAT. tit. 23, § 10(1) (b) (1965), provides that a divorce will be granted
to an innocent and injured spouse where the other spouse "[h]as knowingly entered
into a second marriage, in violation of the previous vows he or she made to the former
spouse where marriage is still subsisting ......
9. PA. STAT. tit. 23, § 10(3) (1965), provides in pertinent part that:
[ilf any spouse, upon any false rumor in appearance well founded of the death
of the other, when such other has been absent for the space of two whole years,
hath married or shall marry again, the party who has not remarried may at his or
her return have his or her own marriage dissolved by divorce on the ground of
bigamy, leaving the other party to remain with the second husband or wife....
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the spouse of the first marriage the remedy for either party to the
bigamous second marriage is annulment.10 The use of this latter remedy
is not surprising, however, since the second marriage is deemed criminal
and a nullity in Pennsylvania."
Bigamy is the only major divorce
ground not based on fault. 12 Its validity is predicated instead on the
belief that monogamy is necessary for the stability of society and on the
consequent moral injury suffered by the other marriage partner.'8 If one
accepts this presumption, the ground must be regarded as being consistent
with the state's interest.
B.

Conriction and sentence for a crime

A spouse has grounds for divorce where the other "shall have been
convicted, as a principal or an accessory either before or after the fact"
of any one of a multitude of criminal offenses where the term of imprisonment is greater than 2 years. 1 4 A two-fold rationale for this ground is
evident upon cursory inspection: (1) the fact that a spouse would be
separated from his mate for a long period of time, and hence the marriage would cease to be functional in the same manner and with a similar
culpability on the part of the criminal spouse as occurs in the case of a
desertion; and (2) the fact that the innocent and injured spouse would
have suffered the moral injury of being married to a criminal, a hardship
in excess of that which she had agreed to bear in her marriage vows.
However, what on the surface appears to be a rational rule to protect
the non-culpable spouse from injury appears upon closer scrutiny to lead
10. PA. STAT. tit. 23, § 12 (1965), providing for annulment of void marriages,
states in pertinent part:
In all cases where a supposed or alleged marriage shall have been contracted,
which is absolutely void by reason of one of the parties thereto having a spouse
living at the time of the supposed or alleged marriage . . . the said supposed
marriage was absolutely void when contracted . . . and may, upon the application
of either party be declared null and void ...
11. PA. STAT. tit. 18, § 4503 (1965), makes bigamy a misdemeanor and expressly
declares such a marriage void.
12. A divorce can be granted where the respondent honestly believed he was
free to marry. Hence, he would not have committed any intentional crime against
his spouse, even though his actions may have caused moral injury to her. See note 9
supra. See generally PA. STAT. tit. 23, § 10 (1965). The other non-fault ground is
incest. PA. STAT. tit. 23, § 10(2) (1965). It is apparent that the same bias manifested
against bigamy on moral grounds would be similarly applicable to incest. Also, the
possibility of genetically defective children would appear to outweigh any undesirability
of allowing a divorce where such inter-marriage is unintentional and without fault.
13. Bigamy is perhaps the least controversial ground for divorce since monogomy
is deeply ingrained within the social mores of Western Civilization. So strong is the
bias against polygamy that the Supreme Court has ruled that the freedom of religion
guaranteed by the first amendment is superceded by the state's interest in monogamy.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). With this cultural background it
would be quite remarkable if bigamy had not been made a ground for divorce.
14. PA. STAT. tit. 23, § 10(1) (h) (1965). Such crimes include arson, burglary,
embezzlement, forgery, perjury, rape and murder et al. It has been held that a sentence of a minimum of less than 2 years, but a maximum of more than 2 years for a
proscribed crime is sufficient to constitute grounds for divorce. Miller v. Miller, 9 Pa.
D. & C. 437, 439 (C.P. Dauph. 1927). Likewise a sentence for an indeterminate length
of time was within the terms of the statute. Fagan v. Fagan, 14 Pa. D. & C. 116
(C.P. Dauph. 1929).
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to some unwarranted results because of its failure to examine whether
a causal nexus exists between criminal conduct and a broken marriage.
Further, this ground is objectionable in that it relegates to the criminal
law a function normally reserved to the civil law - to decide whether
a man or a woman is fit to be a proper spouse. By simply reducing a
possible two year sentence to twenty-three months a judge in a criminal
proceeding can determine a spouse's right to divorce. Also, the ground
is suspect in its reliance on the bad character of the criminal spouse.
It has been held, for example, that since the statute does not refer to
attempts, a divorce cannot be granted no matter how severe the incompleted
offense of the transgressing spouse may be, and consequently the possible
injury to the innocent spouse is not a factor in deciding whether a divorce
should be granted. 15 It would appear, therefore, that the only valid reason
for sustaining the instant ground is the de facto desertion created by the
incarceration of the offending spouse. 16 Forbidding a divorce under
such circumstances would seem to serve no real purpose in respect to
the state's interest. Therefore, despite its objectionable features, the ground
of conviction and sentence for a crime is justifiable in most circumstances
since the stability of the marriage would generally cease during prolonged
incarceration; and if divorce were not granted, the innocent spouse would
be injured by disallowing her to lead a normal life.
C.

Adultery

Adultery is defined as voluntary sexual intercourse of a married
person with one other than the spouse.17 From this definition it is
apparent that certain sexual activities, such as sodomy, which do not
involve intercourse do not qualify under this ground for divorce.', Since
the act must be voluntarily performed, rape does not constitute a cause
15. See Wheeler v. Wheeler, 2 Pa. Dist. 567 (C.P. Lack. 1892) (attempted rape).
This case was decided under prior law; but nothing in the present statute or latter
decisions has altered its conclusion.
16. However, this rationale is somewhat eroded by decisions holding that a
spouse who aided and abetted her husband is unable to obtain a divorce under this
ground. Murphy v. Murphy, 204 Pa. Super. 576, 205 A.2d 647 (1964). Using the
rationale that the offending spouse had deserted, there seems to be no rational basis
for forbidding the divorce other than the innocent and injured spouse doctrine.
17. PA. STATr. tit. 23, § 10(1) (c) (1965), merely states that adultery will constitute a ground for divorce. The courts have defined adultery in its common usage.
Yocum v. Yocum, 3 Pa. Dist. 615 (C.P. Berks 1894).
18. Sodomy can, however, lead to a divorce on the ground of conviction and
sentence for a crime. PA. ST'AT'. tit. 23, § 10(1) (h) (1965). It is interesting to note
that similar conduct forced upon the wife against her will has been considered a basis
for divorce on the grounds of indignities. See, e.g., Best v. Best, 171 Pa. Super. 629,
630, 91 A.2d 296, 297 (1952); Quinn v. Quinn, 6 Pa. D. & C. 712, 714 (C.P.
Schuyl. 1925).
Originally adultery was only available to the husband; and then only because
it was felt that he should not be required to leave his wealth or support the children
of another. See Note, 6 VILL. L. Rtv. 419 (1961). In modern America this ancient
rationale is outmoded, and it is difficult to see any valid reason to find intercourse
automatically objectionable while at the same time finding other sexual relations
unobjectionable within the same legislative context.
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of action for divorce.1 9 Similarly, mistake of fact - e.g., a husband having
intercourse with a third party believing her to be his wife - is a valid
20
defense to a divorce action based on adultery.
Due to the difficulty in obtaining eye witness testimony to the adulterous act, adultery is usually established from circumstances that "lead
to it by fair inference as a necessary conclusion."' 21 The doctrine of
"inclination and opportunity" aids in establishing such circumstances by
creating a presumption of adultery where both an adulterous inclination
is shown on the part of the spouse and the co-respondent and an opportunity is available to satisfy this inclination.2 2 Although the cases turn
on factual determinations, the interplay of these two elements can be
summarized as follows:
(1) A divorce will be granted where:
(a) inclination and opportunity is clearly shown ;23
(b) inclination is clearly shown but opportunity was slight ;24 or
(c) opportunity was clearly shown but inclination was slight.2 5
19. Although this particular question has not been litigated in Pennsylvania, the
law appears to be settled. See Dietrich v. State, 187 Wis. 136, 203 N.W. 755 (1925).
20. 1 J. BIsHOP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCP AND SEPARATION § 1509 (1891) ; Manley v.
Manley, 193 Pa. Super. 252, 164 A,2d 113 (1960) (holding insanity a defense against
adultery). See, e.g., Note 6, VILL. L. Rzv. 419 (1961).
21. While this is a logical evidentiary requirement, given the difficulty of catching a person in the act, it would appear that in many instances where the alleged
adulterer is innocent a divorce would still be granted. See Brown v. Brown, 121 Pa.
Super. 74, 78, 183 A. 90, 92 (1936).
22. See, e.g., Brobst v. Brobst, 171 Pa. Super. 499, 504, 90 A.2d 320, 322 (1952);
Asher v. Asher, 161 Pa. Super. 609, 613, 56 A.2d 321, 322-23 (1948) ; Brown v.
Brown, 121 Pa. Super. 74, 183 A. 90 (1936) ; Pierpoint v. Pierpoint, 108 Pa. Super.
108, 164 A. 808 (1933).
23. See, e.g., Turner v. Turner, 150 Pa. Super. 110, 27 A.2d 434 (1942) (respondent and co-respondent affectionate and were in a locked room together); Isaacs v.
Isaacs, 149 Pa. Super. 508, 27 A.2d 531 (1942) (respondent and co-respondent seen
in bedroom kissing and subsequently lights turned off for an extended period) ; Fulton
v. Fulton, 142 Pa. Super. 512, 17 A.2d 222 (1940) (facts similar to Isaacs). See
FRUSDMAN, supra note 1, at 460-66, for a chronicle of differing factual situations.
24. In such cases the inclination must be shown more clearly than where both
inclination and opportunity is present. See, e.g., Asher v. Asher, 161 Pa. Super. 609,
611. 56 A.2d 321, 322-23 (1948) (where husband found respondent and co-respondent
scantily attired; but together for too short a time to have committed intercourse
on that occasion); Pierpoint v. Pierpoint, 108 Pa. Super. 108, 164 A. 808 (1933)
(wife was seen kissing co-respondent and spent night together) ; Cook v. Cook, 5 Pa.
D. & C. 481 (C.P. Phila. 1924), affd, 85 Pa. Super. 403 (1925) (evidence of lewd

letters expressing passion of respondent and co-respondent and a few daytime visits

was held sufficient to prove adultery). For a complete study of various factual situations see FRZUDMAN, supra note 1, at 466-67.
25. In such cases the opportunity for the adultery must be shown more clearly
than in a situation where both requisites are met. See, e.g., Fulton v. Fulton, 142 Pa.
Super. 512, 515, 17 A.2d 222, 223-24 (1940) (wife rented room to man 20 years her
junior and was seen nude with him but no evidence of affection) ; Brown v. Brown,

121 Pa. Super. 74, 183 A. 90 (1936)

(wife entertained co-respondent late at night,

occasionally with lights extinguished; but only once was she heard to state affection

for him) ; Hitt v. Hitt, 4 Chest. Co. Rep. 409 (1950) (co-respondent leaving respondent's bed at night; but no known statements of affection). See FRSDMA., supra
note 1, at 468-71, for a statement of various factual situations.
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(2) A divorce will not be granted where:
(a) neither inclination or opportunity were shown ;26
(b) inclination was shown without opportunity ;27 or
28
(c) opportunity was shown without inclination.
This evidentiary rule may at times lead to unwarranted results by allowing
a divorce where no adulterous act has in fact been committed. However,
a reasonable apprehension of such behavior by the innocent spouse would
still cause her mental injury and there would appear to be no other means
available whereby adequate enforcement of this ground would be feasible.
It would appear that under normal circumstances the application
of the ground of adultery furthers the state's interest since the granting
of a divorce for adultery is predicated on the commission of the forbidden
act and consequent injury to the innocent spouse. However, in most circumstances the court need not undertake an examination of the marital
condition. Therefore, it is possible for divorces to be granted where the
29
marriage was still capable of fulfilling the state's interests.
D.

Desertion

Another ground for divorce is established where a spouse willfully
and maliciously leaves his place of co-habitation with his or her mate for
more than two years.80 To sustain a divorce action for desertion three
26. See, e.g., Baxter v. Baxter, 147 Pa. Super. 207, 209, 24 A.2d 15, 16 (1942)
(wife found sleeping with man fully clothed) ; Houck v. Houck, 5 Chest. Co. Rep. 6
(1951) (wife found talking to co-respondent late at night in front of respondent's six
year old child) ; Dawson v. Dawson, 12 Leh. L.J. 139 (1926) (woman's voice heard
in respondent's house when wife was away). See FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 471,
for a synopsis of the factual situations.
27. See, e.g., Graham v. Graham, 153 Pa. 450, 25 A. 766 (1893) (letter from
co-respondent making an appointment to meet with respondent at church together with
a picture of that women in his possession and a receipt for a lady's watch which was
not given to wife was held insufficient to prove adultery) ; Wolford v. Wolford, 100
Pa. Super. 251 (1931) (respondent found with woman on his lap at a partially lit
gas station open for business); Peters v. Peters, 4 Pa. D. & C. 287 (C.P. Beaver
1923) (friendliness of wife for a man and his frequent presence generally in the company of third persons is insufficient). See FRgEDMAN, supra note 1, at 471-72, for a
more complete study of various factual situations.
28. See, e.g., Brower v. Brower, 157 Pa. Super. 426, 43 A.2d 422 (1945)
(respondent and co-respondent together in unlighted living room) ; Thomas v. Thomas,
76 Pa. Super. 54 (1921) (respondent in darkened house with a improvised bed in
the kitchen, she denied the presence of the co-respondent, but he was found, fully
clothed in bed with libellant's son) ; Paul v. Paul, 72 Pa. Super. 70 (1919) (libellant
alleged seeing respondent committing intercourse with co-respondent through window;
wife denied it and since there was no inclination court held evidence insufficient). See
FRgUDMAN, supra note 1, at 472-74, for a more complete chronicle of factual situations.
29. Statutory defenses often prevent dissolution in most cases. A typical situation
arises where A commits adultery and B, her husband, knows of her action, but forgives
her. The marriage, providing the husband can live with his forgiveness, would appear
viable and the defense of condonation would be a bar to a divorce action by the
husband. For a more complete analysis of how statutory defenses generally bar a
divorce where the marriage is viable, see the discussion of condonation, connivance
and recrimination pp. 167, 168-70 infra.
30. PA. STAT. tit. 23, § 10(1) (d) (1965).
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elements are required: (1) there must be actual physical withdrawal;31
(2) such withdrawal must be uninterrupted for two years;32 and (3) the
withdrawing spouse must have the intent to desert.33 The requisite intent
has been held to be the desire for a permanent withdrawal even though
34
such an intent need not have existed at the time of original withdrawal.
However, under Pennsylvania law, the mere refusal of sexual intercourse by a spouse for a period of 2 years is insufficient to constitute
35
a desertion.
In practice this ground allows a divorce where one party has been
deserted over his spouse's objections and disallows a divorce where
both marriage partners separate by mutual consent.3 6 This result is
incongruous in light of the state's alleged interests, since in the latter case
both parties have, in effect, decided that a marriage has ceased to be
31. See Pingor v. Pingor, 188 Pa. Super. 447, 149 A.2d 141 (1959); Totino v.
Totino, 176 Pa. Super. 108, 106 A.2d 881 (1954) ; Kohr v. Kohr, 71 Dauph. Co. Rep.

184 (1957).
32. See, e.g., McNally v. McNally, 176 Pa. Super. 494, 108 A.2d 839 (1954);
Kohr v. Kohr, 71 Dauph. Co. Rep. 184 (1957) ; Zirpoli v. Zirpoli, 45 Del. Co. R. 2,

aff'd, 195 Pa. Super. 378, 138 A.2d 295 (1957).
The two year period is to allow the guilty spouse a chance to repent and
therefore reflects the state's desire to preserve marriages. See Bothwell v. Bothwell,
83 Pa. Super. 345, 348 (1924) ; Neagley v. Neagley, 59 Pa. Super. 565. 568 (1915).

33. See Bishop v. Bishop, 30 Pa. 412, 415 (1858); Lilley v. Lilley, 196 Pa.

Super. 261, 175 A.2d 164 (1961); Pingor v. Pingor, 188 Pa. Super. 447, 149 A.2d
141 (1959).
34. See, e.g., Lodge's Estate, 287 Pa. 184, 187-88, 134 A. 472, 473 (1926) (where
the court found the necessity for a "positive and unequivocal act indicating an intention to desert") ; Dodson v. Dodson, 150 Pa. Super. 437, 28 A.2d 821 (1942) (where
a letter indicating the wife's belief the marriage was over was held sufficient to change
separation to desertion). See also Obidinski v. Obidinski, 49 Lack. Jur. 86, 87 (1947)
(where the husband's telling the wife to get out was not such consent as to prevent
her leaving from being considered desertion).
35. See, e.g., Mohser v. Mohser, 149 Pa. Super. 422, 27 A.2d 448 (1942);
Masden v. Masden, 13 Pa. D. & C. 195 (C.P. Phila. 1930); but see Metz v. Metz,
47 Montg. Co. Law Rep'r 89 (1930).
36. Such consent has been held to arise: (1) where there is an express separation
agreement, Doering v. Doering, 157 Pa. Super. 9, 41 A.2d 358 (1945); Bennett v.
Bennett, 14 Luz. L. Reg. Rep. 425 (1909); (2) where the allegedly innocent party
has forced his spouse to leave, even where his conduct is not in itself a grounds for
divorce, Hodgins v. Hodgins, 75 Pa. Super. 187 (1920) (household furniture removed) ; Sexton v. Sexton, 10 Chest. Co. Rep. 289 (1962) (libellant insisted that
they live with his parents though he could afford a separate residence) ; (3) where
there is any encouragement or consent within the statutory period, Benny v. Benny,
87 Pa. Super. 318 (1926) (where deserting party attempted to return and was
repulsed) ; Hartner v. Hartner, 75 Pa. Super. 342 (1921) (parties met frequently
during period of alleged desertion) ; (4) where the remaining spouse speeds his
spouse's departure, Lane v. Lane, 81 Pa. Super. 494, 496 (1923) (where libellant
wished respondent luck and made no effort to persuade her to return in subsequent
meetings) ; (5) where the libellant contrives to get respondent to leave, Smith v.
Smith, 147 Pa. Super. 542, 24 A.2d 660 (1942) (husband displaying greater affection
to cousin than wife) ; Shore v. Shore, 107 Pa. Super. 566, 164 A. 110 (1933) (libellant
tried to get respondent arrested) and; (6) where an offer of reconciliation of respondent to libellant is refused. Helm v. Helm, 143 Pa. Super. 22, 17 A.2d 758 (1941);
Wilhelm v. Wilhelm, 130 Pa. Super. 143, 197 A. 496 (1938) ; Reinhardt v. Reinhardt,
111 Pa. Super. 191, 194, 169 A. 408, 409 (1933).
But see Cobaugh v. Cobaugh, 160 Pa. Super. 362, 51 A.2d 354 (1947),
where it was held that an offer of reconciliation after the 2 year statutory period was
not made in good faith and need not be accepted. Accord, Ussler v. Ussler, 158 Pa.
Super. 215, 218, 44 A.2d 526, 527 (1945) ; Hunsicker v. Hunsicker, 21 Leh. L.J. 171,
172 (1944).
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viable, while in the former no permanent injury may have occurred and
the withdrawing spouse might well be accepted if he could be persuaded
to return through some sort of conciliation service. If unilateral desertion
is a valid reason for the state to allow termination of a marriage then, a
non-fault consensual separation would appear to be an even more
compelling reason to allow such dissolution.

E.

Cruel and Barbarous Treatment

Under Pennsylvania law cruelty constitutes a ground for divorce
where there is shown to be actual personal violence, 1 the reasonable
apprehension of such violence, 8 or a course of conduct which endangers
the spouse's life or health and renders continued cohabitation unsafe.89
While cruelty is generally held to be present where a prolonged course
of conduct is involved, a single act of severe and atrocious proportion
has been held to constitute cruelty. 40 Further, while the usual case
involves beating, fights or other types of assault or battery, miscellaneous
occurrences such as the wilful communication of venereal disease have
also been classified as cruel and barbarous treatment.4 1 But, strangely,
such apparently cruel acts as sexual excesses, 42 mental cruelty, 4 refusal
of sexual intercourse, 44 refusal to bear children,4

5

bad temper, 46 incompat-

37. See, e.g., Serge v. Serge, 66 Lack. Jur. 81 (1964) ; Kardisco v. Kardisco, 54
Schuyl. Leg. Reg. 57 (1957) ; Dehart v. Dehart, 25 Northumb. L.J. 72 (1953).
38. See, e.g., Serge v. Serge, 66 Lack. Jur. 81 (1964); Zadarko v. Zadarko,
109 Pitts. Leg. J. 461 (1961) ; Cordus v. Cordus, 67 Montg. Co. Law Rep'r 296 (1951).
39. See, e.g., Hurley v. Hurley, 180 Pa. Super. 364, 119 A.2d 634 (1956) ; Eberly
v. Eberly, 154 Pa. Super. 641, 36 A.2d 729 (1944) ; Martin v. Martin, 154 Pa. Super.
313, 35 A.2d 546 (1944).
40. See, e.g., Rankin v. Rankin, 181 Pa. Super. 414, 124 A.2d 639 (1956); Sharpe
v. Sharpe, 177 Pa. Super. 76, 110 A.2d 804 (1955) ; Hudak v. Hudak, 34 Del. Co. R.
238 (1946). Such a single act must be such as to endanger the life of the libellant.
See Scholl v. Scholl, 156 Pa. Super. 497, 499-500, 40 A.2d 897 (1945) (assault on
pregnant wife).
41. Such communication must be knowing. See Kelly v. Kelly, 25 Luz. L. Reg.
Rep. 29 (1926) (transmission of gonorrhea, requiring removal of libellant's tubes
and ovaries).
42. Such conduct is generally categorized as indignities unless it endangers life
or health of the innocent spouse and renders cohabitation unsafe. See Krug v. Krug,
22 Pa. Super. 572, 573-74, 40 A. 890, 892 (1903), where forced intercourse over a
period of time where the wife was ill constituted grounds for divorce on the basis of
indignities. See also Diehl v. Diehl, 188 Pa. Super. 491, 149 A.2d 133 (1959), where
such sexual excesses cause danger, divorce may be granted for cruelty.
43. The doctrine of mental cruelty does not exist in Pennsylvania. McCune v.
McCune, 7 Fay. L.J. 25, 26 (1943).
44. See, e.g., Simons v. Simons, 196 Pa. Super. 650, 176 A.2d 105 (1962) ; Walsh
v. Walsh, 61 Lack. Jur. 33 (1960); Vannatta v. Vannatta, 22 Northam. Law Rep.
358 (1930).
45. See, e.g., Hexamer v. Hexamer, 42 Pa. Super. 226 (1910); Vannatta v.
Vannatta, 22 Northam. Law Rep. 358 (1930). Annot., Avoidance of Procreation of
Children as Grounds for Divorce on Grounds of Cruelty, 4 A.L.R.2d 227, 235 (1949),
for a synopsis of the laws in other jurisdictions.
46. See, e.g., Altwater v. Altwater, 81 Pa. Super. 359 (1923) ; Breed v. Breed,
73 Pa. Super. 9 (1919) ; Gabriel v. Gabriel, 3 Pa. D. & C. 607, 610 (C.P. Lehigh 1923).
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ibility, 47 and non-support with the wilful denial of necessities, 48 have
been held insufficient because no actual or threatened physical contact
49
was involved.
Although it is readily apparent that physical violence - actual or
threatened - is a valid ground for divorce where the threatened spouse
is given cause to fear for his or her safety, given the existing state of the
law in other areas, it is questionable whether actual physical contact
should be the only behavior which forms the basis of cruelty. In
recent years the Supreme Court has recognized that in the sphere of
criminal law there can be fear or coercion without violence or the
threat of violence. 50 Likewise, tort law now recognizes that mental
damage can be sustained without precedent physical injury.51 In light of
these developments it seems incongruous that the law of marriage and
divorce would fail to recognize that injury could occur in these possible
situations. It is not difficult to imagine situations in which refusal to
have intercourse may have a greater disruptive effect on a marriage than
slight, though continuous, physical assaults. Likewise, it is not inconceivable that the constant nagging and extravagance of a spouse may
cause irreparable damage to a marriage where physical violence would
not. Consequently, it appears that cruel and barbarous treatment should
be expanded to include what is commonly referred to as mental cruelty
or incompatibility in order to reflect the realities of a marriage situation,
protect the non-culpable spouse from injury, and promote the valid
interests of the state.
F.

Indignities to the Person

Indignities is the most comprehensive ground for divorce in Pennsylvania. The statute establishing it as a ground merely provides that
47. See, e.g., Bigoney v. Bigoney, 67 Montg. Co. Law Rep'r 209, 211 (1951);
Purves v. Purves, 63 Montg. Co. Law Rep'r 264, 267 (1947) ; Frey v. Frey, 49 Lanc.

Law Rev. 88, 90 (1944).

48. Cf. Huston v. Huston, 230 Pa. Super. 501, 513, 197 A. 774 (1938). But such
wilful denial will constitute indignities. See, e.g., Koch v. Koch, 60 Dauph. Co. Rep. 1,
3 (1949) ; Boyd v. Boyd, 60 Montg. Co. Law Rep'r 340 (1944) ; Tripp v. Tripp, 48
Lanc. Law Rev. 325 (1943).
49. This result is inevitable under the statutory language, since respondent must
"have, by cruel and barbarous treatment, endangered the life of the injured and inno-

cent spouse...... PA. STAT. tit. 23, § 10(1) (e) (1965).
50. See Miranda v. United States, 384 U.S. 436, 457

Court stated:

(1966),

where the

It is obvious that such an interrogation environment [unfamiliar surroundings

and police presence] is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This atmosphere carries its own badge of
intimidation.

To be sure, this is not physical intimidation, but it is equally

destructive of human dignity.
See also Escobedo v. United States, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
51. Pennsylvania has yet to allow recovery for mental distress unrelated to
physical injury. See Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958) ; Gefter v.
Rosenthal, 384 Pa. 123, 119 A.2d 250 (1956). However, other, more liberal jurisdictions have begun to repudiate such precedents. See, e.g., Battala v. State, 10 N.Y.2d
237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961) ; Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d 594, 85
N.W.2d 345 (1957).
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the offending spouse "shall have offered such indignities to the person
of the injured and innocent spouse, as to render his or her condition
intolerable and life burdensome. ' 5 2 Due to this nebulous phrase the courts
have been able to fashion a many faceted ground for allowing the dissolution of marriage; subject only to the qualifications that the activity complained of be continuous and that the libellant be an innocent and injured
spouse.53 While the wide range of opinions makes a succinct definition
of indignities impossible, the following behavior has been held sufficient
to constitute a valid cause of action: vulgarity, 4 unmerited reproach, 5
studied neglect, 56 intentional incivity, 57 manifest disdain, 58 abusive language, 59 malignant ridicule, 60 and plain manifestation of settled hate
and estrangement. 6
From a purely legal standpoint the ground of indignities would
appear to be objectionable. It leads to flagrant abuse of evidentiary requirements and places a great burden on the courts. By being so indefinite,
it fails to adequately protect the parties to a divorce action since the granting or denial of a divorce will depend on how individual judges interpret
the statutory language and apply it to the case before them. Consequently
the parties and their attorneys may slant the evidence to place the facts
within the scope of an earlier decision or exaggerate the injury suffered.
However, from the viewpoint of the state's interest, this ground would
seem quite desirable since it allows the court to predicate its decision
on whether the marriage is viable and on the extent of the marital injury.
This ground may tend to encourage collusion, perjury, and subornation
of perjury in the sense that testimony may often be slanted to make
52. PA. STAT. tit. 23, § 10(1) (f) (1965).
53. See, e.g., Campbell v. Campbell, 205 Pa. Super. 207, 208 A.2d 36 (1965);
Nordmann v. Nordmann, 204 Pa. Super. 562, 205 A.2d 690 (1964); Schwertz v.
Schwertz, 197 Pa. Super. 255, 177 A.2d 139 (1962).
54. See, e.g., Yohey v. Yohey, 205 Pa. Super. 329, 208 A.2d 902 (1965) ; Howe
v. Howe, 7 Adams L.J. 40 (1965) (where it was held the granting of a divorce depended on the sensibility of the libellant) ; Slider v. Slider, 7 Chest. Co. Rep. 6 (1955).
55. See, e.g., Yohey v. Yohey, 205 Pa. Super. 329, 208 A.2d 902 (1965) (accusations of infidelity) ; Pore v. Pore, 189 Pa. Super. 615, 151 A.2d 650 (1959) (public
accusations of sexual perversion). However, where the respondent has reason to
believe her allegations are correct such reproach will not be grounds for divorce. See
Thoms v. Thorns, 199 Pa. Super. 369, 186 A.2d 42 (1962), where a wife's reasonable
belief in her husband's adultery barred his divorce on grounds of indignities.
56. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 49 Lack. Jur. 213 (1948) ; Richmond v. Richmond,
10 Schuyl. Leg. Reg. 78 (1944) (staying out nights electioneering and drinking).
57. See, e.g., Evans v. Evans, 152 Pa. Super. 257, 31 A.2d 590 (1943); Sleight
v.Sleight, 119 Pa. Super. 300, 181 A. 69 (1935) ; Daugherty v. Daugherty, 57 Dauph.
Co. Rep. 32 (1945).
58. See, e.g., DiTroia v. DiTroia, 202 Pa. Super. 7, 193 A.2d 877 (1963), af'd,
414 Pa. 256, 199 A.2d 459 (1964) ; Goldfine v. Goldfine, 201 Pa. Super. 462, 193 A.2d
695 (1963) ; Margolis v. Margolis, 201 Pa. Super. 129, 192 A.2d 228 (1963).
59. See, e.g., Trimbur v. Trimbur, 171 Pa. Super. 541, 91 A.2d 307 (1952);
Holman v. Holman, 145 Pa. Super. 555, 21 A.2d 456 (1941).
60. See, e.g., Konosa v. Konosa, 165 Pa. Super. 140, 67 A.2d 662 (1949);
Leavitt v. Leavitt, 34 Del. Co. R. 223 (1946); Wishing v. Wishing, 41 Schuyl. Leg.
Reg. 69 (1945).
61. See, e.g., Duhme v. Duhme, 168 Pa. Super. 406, 78 A.2d 44 (1951); Solof
v. Solof, 161 Pa. Super. 94, 54 A.2d 87 (1947) ; Snyder v. Snyder, 141 Pa. Super. 533,
15 A.2d 383 (1940).
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the arguments and disagreements of a normal marriage appear to create
62
a situation which fits within the judicial interpretation of indignities.
However, this evil is mitigated by the ability of the judges to view the
entire marital situation and the fact that a gross misrepresentation of the
facts is not necessary to ensure the granting of a divorce.

G. Grounds for Divorce A Mensa et Thora
The grounds for divorce a.m.t. (divorce from bed and board) are
similar to those for divorce a.v.m. 68 The principal distinctions between
the two causes of action are that divorce a.m.t. is only available to the
wife ;64 that under divorce a.m.t. permanent alimony may be obtained ;65
and unlike the situation in divorce a.v.m., the libellant need not be an
innocent and injured spouse.66 Also, the parties to a divorce a.m.t. cannot
62. See Bodenheimer, Reflections on the Future of Grounds for Divorce, 8 FAM.
L.J. 179, 182-83 (1968), where the author states under fault principles "fictions,
subterfuges, and outright perjury are resorted to, and divorce by mutual consent, is in
reality a fact .... See also Baum, A Trial Judge's Random Reflections on Divorce:
The Social Problem and What Lawyers Can Do About It, 11 WAYNz L. REV. 451,
473 (1965) ; Traynor, Fact, Skepticism and the Judicial Process, 106 U. PA. L. Rlv.
635, 638 (1958).
63. PA. STAT. tit. 23, § 11 (1965), provides:
Upon complaint, and due proof thereof, it shall be lawful for a wife to obtain
a divorce from bed and board, whenever it shall be judged, in the manner hereinafter provided in cases of divorce, that her husband has:
(a) Maliciously abandoned his family; or
(b) Maliciously turned her out of doors; or
(c) By cruel and barbarous treatment endangered her life; or
(d) Offered such indignities to her person as to render her condition intolerable and life burdensome; or
(e) Committed adultery.
In contrast to the ground of desertion for divorce a.v.m. there is no statutory
time requirement for separation. All that is required is malicious abandonment and a
failure to support. See, e.g., McFarland v. McFarland, 176 Pa. Super. 342, 107 A.2d
615 (1954) ; Knaus v. Knaus, 173 Pa. Super. 111, 95 A.2d 358 (1953) ; McMahon v.
McMahon, 167 Pa. Super. 51, 74 A.2d 718 (1950).
The ground based on the husband's maliciously turning the wife out of doors
requires that the ejection be accomplished by force, the threat of force, or a refusal
on the part of the husband to allow the wife entrance. Sower's Appeal, 89 Pa. 173
(1879). For a husband to have a defense to a divorce a.m.t. on this ground, the wife
must be guilty of some serious marital offense such as adultery. Angier v. Angier,
63 Pa. 450 (1870).
As in divorce a.v.m. a course of conduct is generally required to sustain an
action for divorce a.m.t. for cruel and barbarous treatment; Knaus v. Knaus, 173 Pa.
Super. 111, 95 A.2d 358 (1953).
The standards for establishing indignities is the same as for divorce a.v.m.
See, e.g., Wick v. Wick, 352 Pa. 25, 42 A.2d 76 (1945) (must consist of more than
one act) ; Arnold v. Arnold, 128 Pa. Super. 423, 194 A. 229 (1937) (same prerequisites
as divorce a.v.m. enumerated).
The prerequisites for a divorce a.m.t. on the grounds of adultery are identical
to those of divorce a.v.m.
64. PA. STAT. tit. 23, § 11 (1965), states in pertinent part: "Upon complaint, and
due proof thereof, it shall be lawful for a wife to obtain a divorce from bed and
board. . . ." when any ground for divorce a.m.t. is proved (emphasis added). The
availability of the remedy to the wife alone might be explained by the notion that
there is no reason why the husband could want alimony. However, this thought seems
somewhat specious.
65. PA. STAT. tit. 23, § 47 (1965). Alimony is also available after a divorce
a.v.m., but only to an insane wife. PA. STAT. tit. 23, § 45 (1965). Otherwise only
alimony pendente lite is available. PA. STAT. tit. 23, § 46 (1965)
66. See, e.g., Wick v. Wick, 352 Pa. 25, 42 A.2d 76 (1945); Veit v. Veit, 37
Del. Co. R. 213 (1950).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1969

11

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 8

[VOL. 15

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

remarry since they have been granted what is in effect a legal separation.
Because divorce a.v.m. and a.m.t. are so similar the major portion of
this section will be devoted to a general discussion of the desirability
of this remedy as a means to resolve marital conflicts.
Divorce a.m.t. has been widely criticized as placing an impossible
burden of remaining chaste on both parties, 67 as being unfairly available
69
to only one party, 68 and as creating a generally unnatural situation.
Excluding the religious reasons for refusing to obtain a divorce a.v.m.,
the only reasons for choosing a legal separation would appear to be
vindictiveness, the desire for alimony, and to encourage a later reconciliation. Given these objections to divorce a.m.t., it would appear that no
valid reason exists for including it in modern divorce law. The religions
which disapprove of absolute divorce - divorce a.v.m. - do not forbid
it; but merely refuse to recognize its validity. Therefore, the subsequent
remarriage by the divorced parties is bigamy and a sin in the eyes of
the church. 70 Likewise, divorce a.m.t.'s financial desirability could be
eliminated by granting permanent alimony in divorce a.v.m. and the
possibility of reconciliation would not seem to be enhanced by this remedy
absent mandatory conciliation procedure. Hence, it would appear that
only those wives who through some vindictive motive were desirous
of hurting their husband might be deprived by the abolition of this
remedy since protection against injury can be attained under divorce
a.v.m. 7 1 It is submitted that there is no valid interest which could
cause the state to encourage such vindictive treatment on the part of a
wife. Therefore there appears to be no valid reason for the continuance
of divorce a.m.t. if alimony is added to the remedies available under
divorce a.v.m.
III.

DEFENSES TO DIvoRcE IN

PENNSYLVANIA

There are three statutory defenses which are theoretically available
only against actions brought on the ground of adultery as well as the
four common law defenses applicable to all grounds for divorce in
Pennsylvania or in other states. The three statutory defenses are recrimination, condonation and connivance. The four common law defenses
are laches, collusion, the innocent and injured spouse requirement, and
insanity. Each of these defenses will be explored to determine whether
67. See Evans v. Evans, 1 Hagg. Cons. 35, 119, 161 Eng. Rep. 466, 496 (1790),
cited in FREEDMAN, supra note 1, n.21, at 797.

68. This criteria is abandoned under the Proposed Code.

PROPOSED DIVORCE

CODA § 302. For criticism of the present law see the comment to this proposed section.
69. See BIsHoP, supra note 19, §§ 67-68, cited in FREEDMAN, supra note 1, n. 21,
at 797; 2 VERNIER, AMER. FAMILY LAWS § 114 (1932).
70. Canon Law does not recognize the possibility of a divorce a.v.m. E. TAUNTON,
THE LAW OF THE CHURCH 301 (1906). Therefore, any remarriage would be bigamy,
but a person who had received a civil divorce would merely be viewed as still married
under that dogma.
71. Such permanent alimony is an integral part of the proposed new code.
PROPOSED DIVORCE CODE § 504.
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each is a rational basis for denying a divorce, whether its application
obtains results compatible with the state's interest and whether it reflects
the extent of the parties' injury.
A.

Recrimination

The doctrine of recrimination is essentially the equity doctrine of
clean hands which requires a court to deny relief to a party who is guilty
of a like offense.7 2 In many states the doctrine of recrimination is avail73
However, in
able where the libellant is guilty of any marital offense.
Pennsylvania the defense is statutorily mandated only in those cases
where the libellant is seeking the divorce on the grounds of adultery
and is guilty of the same offense.74 Thus, in the classic case of Ristine
v. Ristine75 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that adultery occurring
76
after the 2 year period for desertion was not a defense to desertion.
This case has been the precedent for a long line of Pennsylvania
cases holding that adultery is no defense to any ground for divorce
77
except adultery.
Of all the laws in the area of divorce none is as irrational as the
law of recrimination. In practice, it maintains those marriages in which
stability is least likely to exist by necessitating a refusal of divorce where
both spouses are engaged in a continual course of action constituting
adultery, where the injury to both parties is usually the greatest, and
where there usually is little or no feeling left within the marriage on
either side. Recrimination, thus, appears to be contrary to the interests
of the state. Instead of promoting stable marriages and allowing dissolution of those which could only perpetuate injury to the marriage
partners, this defense relegates the interests of the parties, and others
who could be affected by the divorce action, to a position subservient to
the fault concept.
B.

Innocent and Injured Spouse

In all divorce actions except those based on consanguinity and affinity,
and marriage on false rumor of death, the libellant must be an injured
72. Moore, A Critique of the Recrimination Doctrine, 68 DIcK. L. Rlv. 157,
162 (1963).
73. For a complete synopsis of the differing state policies see Moore, supra note
72, at 157-59.
74. PA. STAT. tit. 23, § 52 (1965), states in pertinent part: "In any action or suit
for divorce for the cause of adultery, if the respondent shall allege or prove, or it shall
appear in evidence that the libellant has been guilty of the like crime, . . . it shall be
a good defense and a perpetual bar against the same."
75. 4 Rawle 460 (Pa. 1834).
76. Id. at 462.
77. See, e.g., Glass v. Glass, 164 Pa. Super. 118, 121, 63 A.2d 696, 698 (1949)
(indignities); Clark v. Clark, 160 Pa. Super. 562, 566, 52 A.2d 351, 353 (1947)
(indignities) Flick v. Flick, 24 Pa. Dist. 226, 228-29 (C.P. Northam. 1914) (cruelty).
However, a divorce may still be denied under the innocent and injured spouse doctrine.
See pp. 167-68 infra.
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and innocent spouse. 7 s This requirement is a bar to a libellant who is
himself "guilty" of a cause for divorce or has contributed to the commission of the alleged marital wrong.7 9 Though it is one of the requisite
0
elements for the libellant to prove in establishing grounds for divorce,
the rule resembles the defense of recrimination when the divorce is
challenged. 8 ' This application would appear to contradict the statutory
statement that recrimination is only a defense to a divorce action based
on adultery.
To modify this harsh result several states have adopted the comparative rectitude doctrine which maintains that even where both parties
are guilty of marital transgressions a divorce may still be granted to
the party most injured and least at fault.8 2 Pennsylvania has, thus far,
refused to fully accept the comparative rectitude doctrine except to the
extent that a libellant no longer need be completely without fault, i.e.,
he may be the cause of some injury himself.88 Therefore, it appears
that Pennsylvania would refuse a divorce in those cases where the
injury is the greatest and the marriage is most dysfunctional, a posture
that is contrary to the state's interest in promoting marital stability.
C.

Condonation

Condonation is essentially the act of forgiveness and is only avail84
If the
able as a defense to a divorce action based on adultery.
libellant is aware of the defendant's adulterous behavior and forgives
him or her then the libellant is forever barred from obtaining a divorce
on the grounds of that adultery.8 5 Thus, a completely new and independent marital offense is necessary before a valid divorce action can
arise. This is contrary to the majority common law rule under which
condonation is revocable by any act that is inconsistent with proper
78. See generally PA. ST'rA. tit. 23, § 10 (1965).
79. See FRUDMAN, supra note 1, at 848. See, e.g., Murphy v. Murphy, 204 Pa.
Super. 576, 205 A.2d 647 (1964) (provocation of indignities) ; Kretzer v. Kretzer,
2 Lebanon 221 (1947) (cause for divorce justifies desertion).
80. See, e.g., Blatt v. Blatt, 206 Pa. Super. 177, 212 A.2d 907 (1965); Taddigs
v. Taddigs, 200 Pa. Super. 29, 186 A.2d 455 (1962) ; Zirot v. Zirot, 197 Pa. Super. 124,
177 A.2d 137 (1962). The burden of proof on this issue is generally not severe unless
the libellant's conduct is called into question by the respondent.
81. See Rech v. Rech, 176 Pa. Super. 401, 107 A.2d 601 (1954), where the court
stated that a divorce could not be granted on the ground of adultery unless the libellant
was not guilty of adultery, indignities, or cruel and barbarous treatment.
82. See Moore, supra note 72, at 158.
83. See, e.g., White v. White, 56 Schuyl. Leg. Reg. 197, aff'd, 185 Pa. Super. 141,
138 A.2d 162 (1958) ; Trier v. Trier, 43 Del. Co. R. 244 (1956).
84. PA. STAT. tit. 23, § 52 (1965), states in pertinent part:
In any action or suit for divorce for the cause of adultery, if the respondent shall
allege or prove, or it shall appear in evidence, that the libellant . . . has admitted
the respondent into conjugal society or embraces after he or she knew of the
criminal fact.... it shall be a good defense and a perpetual bar against the same.
85. Knowledge is an essential element to the defense. See, e.g., Gosser v. Gosser,
183 Pa. 499, 38 A. 1014 (1898) ; Rich v. Rich, 176 Pa. Super. 401, 107 A.2d 601
(1954). Mere suspicion is not enough, however, Shumaker v. Shumaker, 50 Lanc.
Law Rev. 431 (1947). Nor does condonation bar a subsequent action for future
adultery. Talley v. Talley, 215 Pa. 281, 285-86, 64 A. 523-24 (1906), rev'g, 29 Pa.
Super. 535 (1905).
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conduct of a husband or a wife.86 Unlike the majority of jurisdicitions,
Pennsylvania adheres to the rule that one act of intercourse between the
spouses constitutes absolute proof of condonation . 7 However, for the
defense to be valid the act of intercourse or any other act of forgiveness
must be made with an absolute knowledge or reasonable belief that
adultery had actually been committed by the "guilty" spouse.8 8
The rationale behind the defense of condonation is probably, in
theory, the most easily understandable and defendable. If the offended
party is willing to reconcile and forgive the offending spouse, it would
appear that no real injury had occurred and the couple would have no
difficulty in maintaining a stable marriage. However, under more careful
scrutiny it becomes apparent that inequities exist under this defense. For
example, a spouse deeply in love with the husband or wife may forgive
the spouse's act of adultery only to find out later that he is psychologically
unable to accept the new situation. He will be, however, barred from
seeking the divorce on that ground because of a subsequent act of intercourse (or a similar act of forgiveness) even though he is suffering a
manifest injury and there is no semblance of an existing marriage which
can fulfill the state's purposes. These inequities are the result of the
absolute nature of this defense, the fact that a single act of intercourse
establishes a definite condonation and the fact that no consideration is
given to the actual injuries of the parties and condition of their marriage.8 9
D.

Connivance

Connivance exists where the husband had previous knowledge of
his wife's adulterous behavior, and either encouraged, or profited by it. 90
86. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 518. See Annot., Revival of Condoned Adultery,
16 A.L.R.2d 585 (1951). The burden of proof of condonation is on the party alleging
it See, e.g., Homrich v. Homrich, 75 Pa. Super. 598, 600 (1921) ; Koch v. Koch,
62 Pa. Super. 607, 608 (1916) ; Taylor v. Taylor, 6 Schuyl. Leg. Reg. 179, 184 (1939).
87. See, e.g., Frank v. Frank, 99 Pa. Super. 183, 186-87 (1930); Shumaker v.
Shumaker, 50 Lane. Law Rev. 431, 432 (1947).
88. See Shumaker v. Shumaker, 50 Lane. Law Rev. 431, 432 (1947), where the
court held that living for 5 weeks with a woman 6 months pregnant led to the presumption husband knew of her adultery when she had been outside the country for
13 months.
So absolute is this defense that it has been held that intercourse as late as the
trial itself constitutes condonation, Stewart v. Stewart, 84 Pa. D. & C. 291 (C.P.
Cumberland 1950) (where the court required an affidavit from the libellant disavowing
any cohabitation before entering a final decree a year and a half after the masters
report recommended such action) and that condonation by one spouse does not prevent
the forgiven adulterer from suing the forgiving spouse for divorce upon a subsequent
act of adultery. Talley v. Talley, 215 Pa. 281, 285-86, 64 A. 523, 524 (1906), rev'g,
29 Pa. Super. 535 (1905).
89. This state of mind which is the crucial factor in most states is completely
irrelevant in Pennsylvania. See FRUEDMAN, supra note 1, at 518-19.
90. PA. STAT'. tit. 23, § 52 (1965), states in pertinent part:
In any action or suit for divorce for the cause of adultery, if the respondent
shall allege evidence . . . that the said libellant (if the husband) allowed the
wife's prostitution, or received hire from it, or exposed his wife to lewd company
whereby she became insnared to the crime aforesaid, it shall be a good defense
and a perpetual bar against the same.
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It is available only to the wife and only against a charge of adultery. 91
The courts, in practice, have not been satisfied with the one-sided nature
of this remedy. Thus, in situations where the wife has been guilty
of conduct which fits within the definition of connivance the courts
have found collusion, fraud, lack of sincerity or truth, or lack of clean
hands 92 in the wife's conduct and have denied the divorce for those
reasons. The close questions arise in interpreting what action by the
husband is sufficient to constitute encouragement. It has been held, for
example, that if a husband hires detectives to obtain evidence against
his wife and the agents act to induce her to commit an adulterous act to
produce the evidence - i.e., arrange for her to meet a third party in a
hotel room - the husband is guilty of connivance whether he was aware
93
of their actions or not.
The defense of connivance is closely analogous to the criminal law
defense of entrapment ;94 and if divorce is to remain fault oriented
then this defense would seem to be just as applicable to the law of
divorce as entrapment is to criminal proceedings. As a natural product
of the fault system this defense appears on its face to be free from
objection. In practice it is highly objectionable. In the normal connivance
situation the husband deliberately plots to force the wife into providing
him with the evidence necessary to secure a divorce. Unlike other defenses,
the conniving party is not only at fault by his own actions but he is also
willing to encourage or entrap his spouse into committing a marital crime
to obtain a divorce. Under these circumstances it is hard to imagine that
a husband or wife would be able to maintain a stable marriage after
being denied a divorce because of connivance even though libellant can
not be said to be injured and therefore the state's interest in maintaining
the marriage would appear negligible.
91. PA. STAT. tit. 23, J 52 (1965). While connivance is not mentioned by name,
the common law definition is embodied within the Pennsylvania statute. See Wisnewski
v. Wisnewski, 126 Pa. Super. 540, 543-44, 191 A. 182, 185-86 (1937), where libellant,

during the pendency of his suit for a divorce on the grounds of desertion, arranged
a trip with respondent and his friend who succeeded in seducing her, was not allowed
a divorce on grounds of adultery. See also Nacrelli v. Nacrelli, 228 Pa. 1, 136 A. 228
(1927) (prostitution) ; Berezin v. Berezin, 186 Pa. Super. 340, 142 A.2d 741 (1958) ;
Heimer v. Heimer, 63 Pa. Super. 476 (1916) (husband had reason to believe wife
was having an affair with his business partner, but allowed her to continue meeting
with him).
92. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 527. See Mayberry v. Mayberry, 10 Pa. D. & C.
257, 260 (C.P. Schuyl. 1927), where the wife allowed her husband's mistress to live
within their house.
93. See Wotherspoon v. Wotherspoon, 108 Pa. Super. 309, 164 A. 842 (1933),
for a review of the authorities. See also Illg v. lllg, 78 Pa. Super. 212 (1922);
Fisher v. Fisher, 74 Pa. Super. 538, 547 (1920) ; Clawell v. Clawell, 63 Pa. Super. 88
(1916). But see Teresi v. Teresi, 109 Pa. Super. 513, 514, 167 A. 235 (1933), where
the court enunciated the requirement that the husband's agents actually be "instrumental in procuring the wife's defilement." Accord, Lisle v. Lisle, 128 Pa. Super. 533,
536 (1937).
94. Entrapment occurs where an officer of the law actively encourages an otherwise innocent party to break the law and then arrests him. In order for that defense
to prevail it is required that the defendant would not have committed the crime unless
encouraged to do so. For a discussion of this defense see M. PAULSEN & S. KADISH,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCtSSES 900, 916 (1962).
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E.

Insanity

Insanity is a complete defense to all causes of action for divorce9 5
because the requisite intent for a ground for divorce can not be manifested
while a defendant is insane. 96 Therefore, the courts have held that insanity
within the two year statutory desertion period bars a divorce even where
the requisite intent was present at the inception of the separation.97
Similarly it has been held that the grounds of indignities and cruel and
barbarous treatment are not available where the threatening or insulting
party is not capable of discerning the meaning of what he says. 98
This defense seems rational and totally acceptable within the fault
rationale of divorce, and in most factual situations it seems reasonable.
However, a different and more rational approach would be to make
postnuptial insanity itself a ground for dissolution of marriage.99 If a
husband or wife is found insane for a specific period of time, the other
spouse should be able to sue for divorce provided that measures would
be adopted requiring the libellant to retain financial responsibility for
the institutionalized spouse. While an insane individual is not at fault
in any legal sense, there seems to be no reason why his spouse should
be kept from leading a normal married life and from avoiding injury.
95. See Hibbard, Insanity as a Defense in Divorce Actions, 47 DIcK. L. Rzv.

(1943). See also Kousz v. Kousz, 29 Northam. Law Rep. 357, 364 (1944). 212
On
adultery see Manley v. Manley, 193 Pa. Super. 252, 164 A.2d 113 (1960),
overruling,

Matchin v. Matchin, 6 Pa. 332 (1847); Note, Insanity as a Defense in Divorce
Actions, 3 TEMP. L.Q. 202 (1929). On desertion see Kisner v. Kisner, 69 Pa. D. & C.

67, 68-69 (C.P. Leh. 1949) ; Frederick v. Frederick, 47 Pa. D. & C. 265 (C.P.
Northam. 1943); Mann v. Mann, 14 Pa. D. & C. 303, 304 (C.P. Berks 1930). On
indignities
see Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 199 Pa. Super. 61, 194 A.2d 282 (1962);

Longaker v. Longaker, 184 Pa. Super. 652, 135 A.2d 783 (1948); Barr v. Barr, 72
Montg. Co. Law Rep'r 351 (1956). On cruel and barbarous treatment see Braun v.
Braun, 186 Pa. Super. 260, 142 A.2d 361 (1958). For the old rule on adultery see
Matchin v. Matchin, 6 Pa. 332, 336-37 (1847). However, to constitute a defense the
insanity must be the cause of the marital offense. Carle v. Carle, 192 Pa. Super. 490,
162 A.2d 38 (1960).
96. See FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 512.
97. See, e.g., Kisner v. Kisner, 69 Pa. D. & C. 67, 68-69 (C.P. Leh. 1949);
Frederick v. Frederick, 47 Pa. D. & C. 265 (C.P. Northam. 1943); Mann v. Mann,
14 Pa. D. & C. 303, 304 (C.P. Berks 1930). However, insanity after the 2 year period
is no bar. Little v. Little, 56 Pa. Super. 419, 423 (1914).
98. See, e.g., Barnes v. Barnes, 181 Pa. Super. 427, 124 A.2d 646 (1956) (where
the court held hate and estrangement cannot be manifested by the insane) ; Schwarzkopf v. Schwarzkopf, 176 Pa. Super. 441, 107 A.2d 610 (1956).
It is not surprising that voluntary intoxication is no defense to the acts
which constitute grounds for divorce since the inability to distinguish what is being
done is caused by the erring spouse himself.
For a synopsis of the significant of voluntary intoxication as a criminal defense
see M. PAULSEN & S. KADISH, supra note 94, at 353-62. Cases have held, however,
where a spouse has a drinking problem and the libellant has encouraged her or not
tried to stop her he may not obtain a divorce on the grounds of her actions while
under the influence of alcohol. Ghent v. Ghent, 191 Pa. Super. 432 (1959) ; Scheller
v. Scheller, 108 Pitts. Leg. J. 32 (1960) ; Girard v. Girard, 46 Luz. L. Leg. Rep. 125
(1954); Faynor v. Faynor, 54 Schuyl. Leg. Reg. 24 (1953).
99. Prenuptial insanity is a ground for annulment and thus no problem is created
in this context. PA. ST'AT. tit. 23, § 12 (1965). While such a result is not explicit
within the statute the courts have so interpreted it. Faivre v. Faivre, 182 Pa. Super.
365, 128 A.2d 139 (1957). For a complete discussion of this remedy see Comment,
supra note 6, at 145-48.
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Viewed from the prospective of the offending spouse, insanity differs
greatly from criminal conduct. However, from the prospective of the
injured spouse the result of the institutionalization of an insane spouse
is identical to that of the incarceration of a criminal spouse since in both
cases the non-culpable spouse has suffered injury by being forced to live
alone through no fault of her own. If the state in the latter situation
will allow the divorce to be effected, it would appear that it is unwise
to forbid a divorce after a period of time on the grounds of insanity
simply because the insane spouse is without fault.
F.

Laches and Limitation of Actions

Many states have a statute of limitations for divorce actions. 100
However, the only time requirement in Pennsylvania is in an action for
divorce on the grounds of bigamy upon false rumor of death. Here,
the absent and assumed dead, party is required to file suit within 6
months after his return. 10 1 While the passage of time does not act as
a bar to any other action for divorce, it does have relevance as to the
weight and credibility of the evidence introduced to establish the libellant's
case. 10 2 It also has a bearing on some of the defenses available - i.e.,
failure to bring an action within a long period of time would seem to
indicate condonation and consequent lack of injury where the libellant
had a prior awareness of the act of adultery. t03 Such delay would also
10 4
make it appear more likely that a collusive element is involved.
The use of laches is the most enlightened aspect of the fault concept
of divorce in the Commonwealth. Its use as a means of weighing the
depth of libellant's injuries allows the court to focus on the viability
of the marriage sought to be dissolved. Given the state's interest, it
would appear that the length of time which passes prior to the bringing
of an action bears some relevance to the depth of the alleged injury
and to the possibility of keeping the marriage viable, i.e., a marriage
which has functioned for 10 years despite a former act of adultery would
100. See 2 VERNIER, supra note 69, at § 79.
101. PA. STAT. tit. 23, § 10(3) (1965), states in pertinent part:
If any spouse, upon any false rumor in appearance well founded of the death
of the other, when such other has been absent for the space of two whole years,
hath married or shall marry again, the party who has not remarried may at his
or her return have his own marriage dissolved on the ground of bigamy ...
Any such action shall be instituted within six months after such return.
102. See, e.g., Garroway v. Garroway, 163 Pa. Super. 317, 61 A.2d 379 (1945)
Porter v. Porter, 161 Pa. Super. 119, 121, 53 A.2d 833, 834 (1947) ; Yeager v. Yeager,
19 Pa. Dist. 726, 727 (C.P. Berks 1909) ; McNelis v. McNelis, 31 Luz. L. Leg.
Rep. 313 (1937).
103. Though cohabitation itself is insufficient to give rise to the defense of condonation, it would raise the presumption that an act of intercourse might have taken
place. See, e.g., Valvano v. Valvano, 47 Lack. Jur. 197 (1946) ; Bilynec v. Bilynec,
77 Pitts. Leg. J. 72 (1928) ; Hay v. Hay, 30 Dauph. Co. Rep. 389 (1927).
104. The bringing of a suit years after an alleged marital offense would seem
to indicate that the libellant was not really aggrieved by respondent's actions. Therefore an inference would appear to arise that libellant was now trying to exaggerate
the depth of the guilt with the libellant's acquiescence.
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appear presumptively more stable and show a lesser degree of injury
than one where a divorce action was immediately instituted. The law
of laches is therefore an exception to the general rules concerning grounds
and defenses because it is flexible and allows the court to focus on the
actual ability of a marriage to fulfill the state's interest.
G.

Collusion

Collusion is an absolute bar to a divorce, invoked by the state,
where a cause of action is feigned or created for the purpose of divorce ;105
when a party fails to defend, even when he considers the allegation to be
justified; 106 or when any false appearance of an adversary proceeding
is created where none in fact exists. 10 7 Although it is theoretically
available as a defense to the defendant in a divorce proceeding, it is
seldom used since the conspiring parties are very unlikely to admit their
own guilt or that they are practicing a fraud on the court.' 0 8 In practice
it has been held that an essential element of collusion is agreement between the parties. 10 9 It is not enough that both parties desire an end
to the marriage," 0 or that the defendant fails to appear."' However,
it has been held that coming into a jurisdiction to accept process or to
enter an appearance, while not in itself conclusive, gives reason for
the court to suspect collusion." 2 Likewise, agreements on alimony and
separation are acceptable, but if they are made as consideration for the
divorce the action will be barred." 8
105.
106.
107.
(1965).

See FREDMAN, supra note 1, at 855.
Id.
Id. The basis for this doctrine in Pennsylvania was PA. STAT. tit. 23, § 25
It states in pertinent part: "The petition or libel shall set forth therein ...

that the said complaint is not made . . . by collusion between the said husband and
wife .... " It has been suspended by PA. R.C.P. No. 1126(7) which merely provides

that the complaint must allege "that the action is not collusive."
108. See FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 854.
109. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 284 Pa. 414, 131 A. 236 (1925) ; Baturin v.
Baturin, 20 Pa. Dist. 43, 44 (C.P. Dauph. 1910) ; Hinkle v. Hinkle, 7 Chest. Co. Rep.
162 (1956).
110. See, e.g., Loomis v. Loomis, 20 Pa. Dist. 731, 733-34 (C.P. Berks 1910)
Sarvis v. Sarvis, 32 Dauph. Co. Rep. 26, 28 (1928) ; Brown v. Brown, 71 Pitts. Leg. J.
856 (1923). See also Annot., Collusion as Bar to Divorce, 109 A.L.R. 832, 834 (1937).
111. See, e.g., Lyon v. Lyon, 13 Pa. Dist. 623, 634 (C.P. Phila. 1904) ; Preston v.

Preston, 11 Pa. Dist. 97 (C.P. Phila. 1901) ; Ash v. Ash, 10 Lack. Jur. 105 (1909). If
an agreement does exist, however, this is collusion. See Greene v. Greene, 150 Pa.
Super. 182, 186, 27 A.2d 525, 526-27 (1942) ; Dunlap v. Dunlap, 97 Pa. Super. 405,
411-13 (1930).
112. In Loomis v. Loomis, 20 Pa. Dist. 731, 733-34 (C.P. Berks 1910), the

court stated:
If ... in instituting his action and in the conduct of it, he proceeded adversely,
the fact that the respondent failed to oppose it, or even put herself in the way of
service of process, notices, etc., could not possibly affect his rights or visit him
with the consequences of an unlawful scheme to which he was not in any way
committed. . . . Let it be granted that a case circumstanced as this one calls
for close scrutiny of the facts; that . . . there were features about it which
required explanation.
Accord, Groenke v. Groenke, 18 Pa. D. & C. 245, 246 (C.P. Leh. 1932) ; Burke v.
Burke, 46 Pa. C.C. 446, 448 (1917) ; Windsor v. Windsor, 44 Pa. C.C. 661 (1916).

113. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 176 Pa. Super. 64, 67, 106 A.2d 627, 629 (1954) ;
Filbert v. Filbert, 40 Luz. L. Leg. Rep. 214, 216 (1948) ; Smith v. Smith, 38 Luz. L.
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Collusion is a necessary evil of the fault concept of divorce. In
promoting a system by which parties cannot decide to terminate their
marriage by mutual consent and, thus, curtail their marital injuries, the
legislature of Pennsylvania has fostered a system in which lying is more
beneficial than the truth. Since the state has failed to take cognizance of
the effects of the fault system and, therefore, failed to eliminate the
desirability of lying it has been forced to adopt the doctrine of collusion
to protect the integrity of the courts. It is posited that the only effect
of the fault concept of divorce is to create a predisposition on the part
of parties who mutually desire a termination of their marriage to practice
deceit; and while there are no statistics available it would not seem
incongruous to believe that some judges overlook collusive acts. 1 14 Until
the state recognizes the defects of the fault system and adopts a system
that reflects the realities of the marital arrangement and the injuries
suffered by its parties the prevalence of collusive actions will continue
to be a detriment to the judicial system and will place the state in the
untenable position of either forcing the continuation of marriages which
retard the state's interest or countenancing the commission of fraud." 5

IV. NON-FAULT

GROUNDS AND THE STATE'S INTEREST

In the preceding sections the inequities resulting from the fault
grounds and defenses in Pennsylvania have been observed. These inequities are generally caused by the failure of fault grounds to reflect
the realities of a marital situation and the injury to the non-culpable
parties. This has led to a failure to adequately protect or further the
state's interest in the durability of marriage. This section of the Comment
will focus on two alternatives to the fault concept of divorce: the
addition of a non-fault ground to the existing fault grounds, while
keeping a basically fault based rationale of divorce law; and a total
Leg. Rep. 49, 53 (1944). For a complete discussion of alimony and separation agree-

ments in Pennsylvania see Comment, Separation Agreements Under Pennsylvania
Law: The Impact of Domestic Policy on Private Contracts, 15 VILL. L. Rev. 120
(1969); Comment, Permanent Alimony Upon Absolute Divorce - A Necessary
Change in Pennsylvania Law, 15 VILL. L. Rzv. 187 (1969).
The furnishing of evidence by the respondent to the libellant has also been
held to constitute collusion. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 284 Pa. 414, 418, 131 A. 236,
237 (1925); Commonwealth v. Glennon, 92 Pa. Super. 94, 100, 102 (1927). For a
contrary view see Annot., Collusion as Bar to Divorce, 109 A.L.R. 832, 837 (1937).
However, paying the costs and expenses of the libellant has been held merely
a grounds for suspicion. In Klair v. Klair, 3 Pa. D. & C. 419, 430 (C.P. Dauph. 1923),
the court stated, "In offering to pay the expenses of obtaining his wife's divorce and
actually paying the same, the respondent only did what the court would have reqaired
him to do had a petition been presented to us." Accord, Conrad v. Conrad, 5 Pa.
D. & C. 47 (C.P. Lanc. 1923) ; Wilson v. Wilson, 73 Pitts. Leg. J. 510 (1925)
Brown v. Brown, 71 Pitts. Leg. J. 856 (1923).
114. See Baum, supra note 62; Bodenheimer, supra note 62, at 179; Sayre, Divorce
for the Unworthy: Specific Grounds for Divorce, 18 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 26,
27 (1931); Traynor, supra note 62. See A.B.A. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
No. 29, which states in pertinent part: "The counsel upon trial of a cause in which

perjury has been committed owe it to the profession and to the public to bring the
matter to the knowledge of the prosecuting authorities."
115. Furthermore, if judges do condone such action they are condoning fraud and
perjury -

neither

of which can be countenanced.
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rejection of fault principles for a non-fault rationale based on the vitality
of the marriage which is sought to be dissolved. To effectuate this
analysis the newly enacted divorce law of New York and a divorce
reform bill, recently amended and passed, in California will be examined,
as models of the two alternatives, to determine if they more adequately
protect the interests of the state which, as previously noted, consist of
maintaining societal stability by: (1) regulating the sexual activity of
society; and (2) providing a means of training children.
A.

The New York Experience

Prior to 1967 the divorce law of New York was one of the most
6
stringent in the nation, allowing divorce only on the grounds of adultery" 7
years."
5
for
spouse
the
or on the disappearance, not desertion, of
In 1966 legislation was enacted, effective in 1968, which expanded the
fault grounds;118 and added a non-fault ground which provides for
divorce where:
The husband and wife have lived separate and apart pursuant
to a written agreement or separation, subscribed and acknowledged
.. . by the parties thereto in the form required to entitle a deed to
be recorded, for a period of two years after the execution of such
agreement and satisfactory proof has been submitted by the plaintiff
that he or she has substantially performed all the terms and
conditions of such agreement." 9
Upon cursory examination it would appear that the state had abrogated,
at least in part, its third party status in divorce proceedings, but in
actuality the reverse is the case.
Section 215 of the Domestic Relations Law indicates that while
the legislature was taking a more modern approach to the problems of
marriage and divorce, it was also attempting to provide a more sensible
method to salvage marriages. This section authorizes the establishment
of Conciliation Bureaus in all judicial districts of the New York Supreme
Court. 20 Plaintiffs in any fault or non-fault divorce proceeding must
file a notice of the instituted divorce action within 20 days with the
116. N.Y. Dom. REL.

LAW

§ 170 (McKinney 1964).

117. N.Y. DoM. Rlg. LAW § 220 (McKinney 1964).

118. The new grounds are cruel and inhuman treatment, abandonment, imprisonment for 3 years, and proof that the terms of a decree or judgment of separation had

been carried out for 2 years. N.Y. DoM. RIL. LAW § 170 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
The judicial judgment or decree of separation can only be obtained under fault grounds.
N.Y. DoM. R4L. LAW § 200 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
119. N.Y. DoM. RtL. LAW § 170(6) (McKinney Supp. 1969).
120. N.Y. Dom. RL. LAW § 215 (McKinney Supp. 1969), states in pertinent part:
There is hereby created and established a conciliation bureau . . . in each
judicial district of the supreme court. The head of such bureau in each judicial
district shall be a supreme court justice. . . . Such justice shall be the chief
administrative officer of the bureau and shall have the responsibility for administering and supervising the affairs of the bureau in accordance with rules and
regulations promulgated by the appellate division of the appropriate judicial

. . ..
Published department
by Villanova University
Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1969

21

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 8
VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 15

local conciliation bureau or the action will be discontinued. 21 Once this
notice is filed and divorce proceedings are instituted, a court-appointed
commissioner is to call one conciliation conference which all parties are
required to attend.12 2 The purpose of this conference is to facilitate
and promote a reconciliation; and the assistance of physicians, phychiatrists, or clergymen may be sought if the parties consent.123 While the
procedural details outlined by the statute for these conferences are
vague, the conciliation counselor assigned to the case by the commissioner
must issue a final report to the supervising justice of the conciliation
bureau in the district where the divorce action is to be litigated. 24 The
statute does not specify what use this report will serve once it reaches
the justice. However, since the report is only made if reconciliation has
not been accomplished, and since, under a fault ground, all elements
of the ground must be alleged and proved, it appears safe to assume that
the only bearing it could have is in establishing the depth of injury.
Consequently, a divorce can still be granted regardless of the chance
of re-establishing a viable marriage and this procedure will have no value
except that of effectuating reconciliations.
New York's new divorce code and procedures establish the principle
that while the state retains an interest in the stability of marriage, that
interest only extends to those marriages which can fulfill the purposes
supported by the state. Consequently, while permitting divorce by mutual
consent under the non-fault ground, the New York legislature at the
same time demanded an attempted reconciliation in both fault and nonfault proceedings to see if the marriage could be made functional. It
further provided for a statutory waiting period under the non-fault ground
presumably theorizing that: (1) if the parties could not resolve their
problems within 2 years there would be real injury to the parties and
the marriage would not be functional; and (2) if the state allowed
immediate dissolution of the marriage, it would abrogate its position
121. N.Y. DoM. RL. LAW § 215-c(A) (McKinney Supp. 1969), states in pertinent part:

Within twenty days after the commencement of a matrimonial action . . .
the party plaintiff in such action shall file with the conciliation bureau in the
judicial district where the action is pending, a notice of commencement of such
action. Failure to file the notice . . . shall be deemed a discontinuance of the
cause of action except for good cause shown to the court.
122. This requirement is waived on a showing of good cause. The statute is vague
as to what circumstances constitutes such good cause, and it is conceivable that the
purpose of the conciliation service will be made meaningless by a broad interpretation
of this phrase. N.Y. DoM. RIL. LAW § 215-c(b) (2) (McKinney Supp. 1969).
123. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 215-c(e) (McKinney Supp. 1969), states:
In conducting a conciliation conference, a counselor shall do such acts as he
feels necessary to effect a reconciliation of the spouses or an adjustment or
settlement of the issues of the matrimonial action. To facilitate and promote the
reconciliation the counselor may, with the consent of the parties, recommend or
make use of the assistance of physicians, psychiatrists or clergymen of the religious
denomination to which the parties belong.
124. Note, A New Look for New York Divorce, 2 PORTIA L.J. 315, 319 (1967).
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as an interested party to the action and make the existing fault grounds
meaningless 125 in the new legislative context.
It is posited that given the vigorous opposition to divorce reform
by religious groups 126 a complete abolition of the fault concept of divorce
was impossible despite any possible contrary inclinations of the New York
legislature. Thus, the criticism of the New York law will focus only
upon the desirability of the non-fault ground.
It must be noted that it is too early to tell what effect the conciliation
service or the new ground will have in New York except that under
this new ground it will be easier to obtain a divorce where both parties
desire termination. Evidence as to its possible efficacy may be derived
from a voluntary conciliation service which has been in effect in Los
Angeles County since 1939.127 This system, with a highly qualified staff
accomplished a 63.8 percent reconciliation record in 1962 for those cases
where both parties attended the hearings 128 and three out of four of those
couples remained together for at least a year. 2 9 Though these results
appear encouraging, it is essential to realize that only those couples
interested in reconciliation requested this service, 30 and that in 1962
those requesting help constituted only six percent of those filing divorce
actions. 13 This indicates that only four percent of the total population
starting divorce proceedings were reconciled through this service. Therefore, observing the overall situation, the only conclusion that can safely
be drawn is that reconciliation is of value when the parties themselves
are amenable to resolving their differences.
Thus, an initial criticism to adopting this type of law in Pennsylvania
would be that the creation of a compulsory conciliation service would be
wasteful and time consuming. If a voluntary system can achieve positive
results with only 63.8 percent of those couples desiring reconciliation, it
is apparent that it would be less effective with those who have no desire
to reconcile. Given the limited amount of state funds available for such
services and the lack of qualified psychiatrists, psychologists, and sociologists to perform its functions, a more effective approach would appear
to be the adoption of a voluntary service whereby the state could devote
its limited energies and resources to saving those marriages most susceptible to reconciliation. The argument against making such a service
125. If there were no waiting period parties would be encouraged to use the non-

fault grounds in all cases where they could agree to terminate the marriage, and the
state would lose all control over uncontested divorce proceedings.
126. Id. at 315, citing N.Y. Times, April 28, 1966, at 36, col. 1. This opposition
was especially acute from the Catholic Church.
127. CAL. CiV. PRO. §§ 1730-72 (West 1955).
128. REPORT oF THZ CONCILIATION COURT OF Los ANGELES COUNTY, Preface of
Roger Alton Pfaff, Presiding Judge (Jan. 1, 1963), cited in Lawless, Compulsory
Conciliation for New York, 14 BUFFALO L. Riv. 457, 459 (1965).
129. Id.
130. Lawless, supra note 128, at 459.
131. FINAL REPORT OF THE (CALIFORNIA) INTERIM COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY,
Vol. 23, No. 4, at 60 (1963), cited in Note, Divorce Law - Compulsory Conciliation
Through the Judiciary, 31 ALBANY L. Rv. 114, 117 (1967).
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mandatory is especially strong where there are no minor children. In
such circumstances an invasion of a couples privacy would not appear
justified because there is no compelling state interest other than its
moral distaste for divorce in keeping the marriage together. Further,
one would hope that the non-legal officers of such a court would not
be appointed as in New York but would be chosen by merit as in Los
Angeles to assure that persons qualified by education and experience will
be in control of the delicate problems of resolving marital differences.
Finally, if such a service must be made mandatory then it should be done
as part of the separation and not the divorce proceedings. The chance
of reconciliation would appear to be greater at the advent of the marital
disharmony than after a 2 year separation during which the differences
of the parties have had a chance to magnify.
The non-fault ground itself would appear to be objectionable for
two reasons. First, since the non-fault ground requires a 2 year waiting
period before an action can be commenced, it would appear that the
state has implicitly encouraged the use of the available fault grounds by
effectuating a faster settlement of marital difficulties under the latter
concepts. While this 2 year waiting period is not objectionable, it is a
weakness when coupled with fault grounds for divorce because parties
who desire a divorce in order to remarry may still resort to collusion,
perjury, and fraud in order to establish a fault ground rather than wait
2 years to consummate their desires. Another possible result of allowing this procedure to coexist with the fault grounds is to place the
state in a somewhat inconsistent position. It would claim a third party
interest in all actions for divorce except those under the non-fault ground,
where it would deny itself any interest save for one possibly meaningless
conciliation session. The judiciary, in the face of this inconsistency,
may be encouraged to attempt to make the fault and non-fault grounds
consistent through its decisions. This could result, through an evolutionary
process, in a system whereby divorces would either be difficult or easy
to obtain under both fault and non-fault grounds. The courts could
accomplish this end through a liberal interpretation of the statutory
fault requirements or an exceedingly stringent interpretation of the nonfault ground by requiring that all terms of a separation agreement be
explicitly followed.
Second, is the fact that the non-fault ground is only available to
couples who have agreed to end their marriage. The requirement of the
statute that there be a signed and witnessed separation agreement between
the parties18 2 seems to preclude any non-fault divorce for non-consenting
132. N.Y. Dom. RML. LAW § 170(6) (McKinney Supp. 1969), provides for a
divorce where:
The husband and wife have lived separate and apart pursuant to a written
agreement of separation, subscribed and acknowledged . . . by the parties thereto
in the form required to entitle a deed to be recorded, for a period of two years
after the execution of such agreement and satisfactory proof has been submitted
by the plaintiff that he or she has substantially performed all the terms and
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss1/8
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couples. This prerequisite notes a valid distinction in divorce proceedings
and acknowledges the greater state duty accruing where a stronger
possibility of reconciliation may exist. However, it makes the ground
virtually nugatory by limiting its application to divorce proceedings in
which a default decree could be secured more rapidly under fault
ground - presumably if both parties could agree to a separation agreement they could agree not to contest a divorce action based on fault,
provided no social stigma attaches to that ground. This total preclusion
to non-consenting parties cannot be justified since there are cases where
no fault exists but the state's interest would still demand termination of
the marriage due to the injury to the non-culpable spouse.
It is submitted that the adoption, in Pennsylvania, of a coexistent
non-fault ground, with or without conciliation procedure, is preferrable
to the law as it presently exists. This change would at least give
implicit recognition to the fact that the mutual desire of the parties to
end a marriage creates a situation where the continuation of the marriage
would not further the state's interest in the "marriage contract."
B. A California Proposal
California's divorce law was essentially identical with that of Pennsylvania, with several fault grounds available to the libellant and statutory
defenses available to the defendant. 133 In 1966 the Governor's Commission on the Family was established to undertake a "concentrated
assault on the high incidence of divorce in our society and its often tragic
consequences. '"134 The Commission's final report and recommendation
was summarized as follows:
[T~he Commission recommends, in essense, the creation of a
statewide Family Court system as part of the Superior Court, with
jurisdiction over all matters relating to the family. The Family
Court is to be equipped with qualified professional staff to provide
counseling and evaluative services. We recommend that the existing
fault grounds of divorce and the concept of technical fault as a
determinant in the division of community property, support and
alimony be eliminated, and that marital dissolution be permitted
only upon a finding that the marriage has irreparably failed, after
penetrating scrutiny and after the parties have been given by the
judicial process every resource in aid of conciliation. We recommend
that a neutral petition be substituted for the present adversary
pleading by complaint and answer. In short, it has been our
conditions of such agreement. Such agreement shall be filed in the office of the
clerk of the county wherein either party resides within thirty days after the
execution thereof. In lieu of filing such agreement, either party to such agreement may file a memorandum of such agreement, which memorandum shall be
similarly subscribed and acknowledged as was the agreement of separation ....

133. CAL. CIV. PRO. §§ 92, 111 (West 1955). Grounds include adultery, extreme

cruelty, wilful desertion, wilful neglect, habitual intemperance, conviction of a felony
and incurable insanity. Defenses include connivance, collusion, condonation, recrimination and laches.
134. Letter from Governor Edmund G. Brown to the Governor's Commission on
the Family, May 11, 1966, cited in Hammer, supra note 3, at 32.
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goal to establish procedures for the handling of marital breakdown
which will permit the Family Court to make a full and proper
inquiry into the real problems of the family - procedures which
will enable the Court to focus its resources upon the actual difficulties
confronting the parties, and will at the same time safeguard
their rights and
preserve the confidentiality of the information
8 5
thus acquired.'
In furtherance of these objectives Senate Bill 252 was introduced
in the California Senate. It was the first major attempt to adopt a
totally non-fault divorce code and will be examined as originally introduced as a possible alternative solution to codes based on fault, even
though it was so amended that many of its desirable features were
removed. Senate Bill 252 proposes that the legal aspect of the divorce
procedure be minimal, with the essential fact-finding being done by
sociologists and psychologists employed by the court, who will guide the
parties and inform the judge whether the parties are reconciled or wish
to proceed with the divorce.'l 6 If the latter choice is made, the counseling
service will provide help in working out child support, alimony and
property settlement agreements pursuant to a final divorce decree. The
judge granting the decree can do nothing to prevent the divorce except
delay the final action for 90 days.'8 7 Thus, the fault concept is completely
eliminated and the entire focus of the process is on the discovery of
the true status of the marriage and the possibility of its continued viability.
It is submitted that this is the proper procedure for investigating and
possibly terminating a marriage; however, certain variables which would
effectuate a more realistic and desirable law have been overlooked by
8
the drafters of this proposed bill.'3
First it proceeds on the tacit assumption that the social and psychological workers of the family court will be told the complete truth and
135. REPORT OP THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE FAMILY 1-2 (1966), cited in
Hammer, supra note 3, at 32-33.
136. S.B. 252 Calif. Legislature, Reg. Sess. as amended March 4 and March 17,
1969, at §§ 4600-21. Hereinafter cited as SENATE BILL 252.
137. SENATE BILL 252, at § 4615(a), provides in pertinent part:
At the hearing, the court shall render its judgment decreeing the dissolution
of the marriage . . . unless it finds that the legitimate objects of matrimony have
not been destroyed because there is a reasonable likelihood that the marriage can
be saved. If the court so finds, it shall continue the proceeding for a period not
to exceed 90 days during which time the parties may avail themselves of the
services of the professional staff ....
At any time after the termination of such

90-day period, either party may move for dissolution of the marriage . . . and
the court shall enter its judgment decreeing the dissolution of the marriage ....
(emphasis added).
Since there is no requirement for conciliation procedure during the 90-day
period it is posited that this procedure may often be inadequate as a means of effectuating a reconciliation. Therefore, a better alternative might be to have mandatory
counseling during this period, especially if there are minor children involved.
138. Senate Bill 252 as finally enacted is totally non-fault in theory. It allows
divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences regardless of the fault of the
parties. However, it also allows a divorce on the ground of incurable insanity. This
ground is also non-fault, but only in the sense that the respondent has committed
no intentional act that adds to the marriage instability. S.B. 252 Calif. Legislature,
Reg. Sess. as amended March 4, March 17, May 15, June 5 and June 13; adopted
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will therefore be better able to effectuate a reconciliation. It would
appear that while this system may achieve significantly better results
in avoiding perjury,3 9 reconciliation will only be achieved where the
parties are amenable to effectuating that result.
Second, the proposed reform totally disregards the state's interest
in perpetuating a marriage. While "[r]ecognizing that the family is
the essential basis of society,' 140 Senate Bill 252 proposes divorce by
consent or by the desire of either party. The only time that the legal
machinery of the state becomes involved is in custody or support
proceedings after the divorce has been determined consensually by the
parties or by decision of either spouse. It would appear that, where
there are minor children or where only one party seeks a divorce, the
state's interests in societal stability and the training of children would
supersede the individual's right of privacy. However, where these variables are non-existent the state interest ceases to predominate; since
society's moral distaste for divorce should not be allowed to be imposed
on an individual right to privacy. Therefore, a neutral position would
appear justified where the divorce is either consensual or non-consensual
and there are no minor children or possibly even where the divorce
is consensual and such children exist. However, where only one party
desires a divorce and there are minor children, it is unjustified and the
state has a right to demand an attempted reconciliation. The only
difference under the proposal between the aforesaid situations is the
requirement that, in the latter case, both parties be present at the initial
interview with the counselors. 14 1 It would appear that at least a longer
waiting period should be required in the latter case since the presence
of children increases the state's interest in opposing dissolution regardless
of the extent of injury caused by the parties.
While it would appear that there were some shortcomings in the
California proposal even in its imperfect form, it was far superior to
either the fault or mixed fault non-fault systems. Had the legislation
been adopted intact, California would have had a system designed to
pursue its legitimate objectives. The entire focus of the legislation was on
the process of determining whether the extent of the injury precluded the
viability of a marriage. The search for an innocent and injured spouse
by assembly conference report July 24; adopted by Senate conference report July 28,

at § 4506 (1969).
Under this act the relatively undefined term of irreconcilable differences as
"substantial reasons for not continuing the marriage" would appear to give the
judiciary discretion to determine their results by taking evidence in a manner similar to,
if not identical to, fault proceedings. Id. at § 4507. This discretion seems to be an

unfortunate provision in the enacted legislation as is the lack of a conciliation service.

139. There would be no power vested in the court to deny a divorce, only a
90-day delay could be required and, therefore, there would have been no penalty for
telling the truth and an unhappy couple could not be judicially required to remain
together. SANATz BILL 252, at § 4615. See note 135 supra for a discussion of
this provision.
140. SXNAv4 BILL 252, at § 4001.
141. SSNATs BILL 252, at § 4605(a).
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would have been abandoned. 142 By establishing a proceeding whereby sociological and psychological study would have Eeplaced legal maneuvering
the state would have placed the problem in the hands of those most
able to effectuate a reconciliation. Only through an actual reconciliation
can a troubled family possibly fulfill the state's goals; for, the mere
refusal to grant a divorce does not guarantee the functioning home
necessary to achieve those ends.
V.

PENNSYLVANIA -

THE PROPOSED CHANGES

The proposed Pennsylvania Divorce Code is essentially patterned
after that of New York. The existing divorce grounds are retained and
expanded, the defenses are limited,'143 and a non-fault ground - a 2 year
separation - is added.1 4 4 These changes would appear to facilitate the
granting of a divorce under the fault grounds and to guarantee a divorce
to those willing to wait the statutory period under the non-fault ground.
The Proposed Code also includes a provision for the retention and expansion of the Domestic Relations Division, which previously dealt only with
custody problems, 145 so that it now gains the additional function of marriage counseling.1 46 This division would only perform mandatory services
in a case where the parties had minor children. 147 By this requirement it is
posited that Pennsylvania, unlike New York, would properly make a differentiation between divorce actions involving minor children and those
where no children are involved.148 However, since there are no requirements pertaining to the qualifications of the counselors, 149 it is questionable
whether they will be able to provide an adequate service to couples whose
marriages are in danger of dissolution. The new service may, therefore,
only be valuable as an initial recognition by Pennsylvania of the state's
proper function in divorce proceedings.
142. SENATE BILL 252, at § 4600-21. See Broadway, The M th of the Innocent
Spouse, 11 TUL. L. REv. 377 (1937) ; McCurdy, Divorce - A Suggested Approach
with Particular Reference to Dissolution for Living Separate and Apart, 9 VAND. L.
REv. 685, 706 (1956); Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 53 U.
VA. L. REv. 32 (1966).
143. The grounds are set forth in PROPOSED DIVORCE CODE § 301. Insanity is the
only additional ground. PROPOSED DIVORCE CODE § 301(1) (b).
The proposals would eliminate the defenses of recrimination, condonation,

connivance and collusion, but the last three would be considered by the judge in
determining whether to grant a divorce. PROPOSED DIVORCE CODE § 304.
144. PROPOSED DIVORCE CODE § 301(1) (c), provides that a divorce will be granted
where a couple have been "[living apart for a continuous period of two years because
of estrangement due to marital difficulties."
145. PROPOSED DIVORCE CODS § 201. See also PROPOSED DivoRc4 CODS § 201,
Comment at 83-84.
146. PROPOSED DivoRcz CODE § 201.
147. PROPOSED DIVORCE CODE § 202.
148. One of the prime interests of the state in the success of marriages is the
maintenance of adequate facilities for the training of children. See Broadway, supra
note 3, at 384. See pp. 155, 175 snpra.
149. The proposal merely provides that the domestic relations division "shall
appoint such qualified probation officers and other assistants as are necessary for the
efficient and useful operation of such domestic relations division." PROPOSED DIVORCE

CODE § 201. This language allows for appointments made on other than true qualification by merit, and could easily lead to political appointments and inadequate conciliation procedure.
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183

A. Grounds
The new legislation adds one completely new fault ground for divorce
and significantly modifies a second. As previously noted, 15 0 the ground
of divorce based on conviction for a crime is inadequate in not providing
for relief when the criminal spouse was found guilty of an attempt. The
proposed code eliminates this inadequacy by making conviction of the
crime of attempt and sentence for 2 years a ground for divorce.'"' It was
likewise noted 152 that it was illogical for incarceration for a crime to be a
ground for divorce where a similar institutionalization for insanity was
not. This defect is also remedied by a new provision providing that committment to an institution for 5 years will constitute a ground for divorce. 153
Presumably the additional 3 year statutory period reflects the lack of fault
on the part of the insane spouse as opposed to that of the convicted felon. 5 4
The final proposed change relating to grounds for divorce is the inclusion of a non-fault ground which provides that a divorce will be granted
where the parties are "[11 iving apart for a continuous period of two years
because of estrangement due to marital difficulties."' 55 This addition,
while beneficial, is subject to many of the same objections as New York's
procedure, the most notable being that the 2 year wait will discourage
the use of the ground as long as fault grounds are more quickly available. 5 6
The comment to this section of the Code recognizes this possibility but
indicates that the presence of several fault grounds will somehow alleviate
that problem. 157 This assumption is seemingly dubious and it is submitted
that, if adopted, the non-fault ground will probably be used sparingly.
However, it can constitute a meaningful reform especially when used where
150. See p. 158 supra.
151. PROPOSED DIVORCE CODE § 301(1)(a)(v).
152. See p. 172 supra.

153. PROPOSED DIvORCZ CODE § 301 (1) (b), provides that a divorce will be
granted for:
Insanity or serious mental disorder which has resulted in confinement in a mental
institution for at least five years immediately before the filing of the complaint,

where there is no reasonably foreseeable prospect of the defendant's spouse
being discharged from such institution. A presumption that no such prospect of
discharge exists shall be established by a certificate of the superintendent of such
institution to that effect (emphasis added).
The language of the proposal seems to reflect the non-fault nature of this ground by
demanding proof not only of the condition precedent to the divorce, but also of its

almost definite continuance.

154. The PROPOSED DivoRce CODE § 301 (1) (a) (i), retains the 2-year statutory

separation period for desertion.

155. PROPOsED DIvoRcE CODE § 301(1)(c).

156. See p. 178 supra.
157. PROPOSED DIvORcE CODE § 301, Comment at 94-98, states in pertinent part:

The proposed ground - living apart for two years - (1) (c) is ... based on
similar statutes in many jurisdictions.... In Denmark there are only two grounds
for divorce: adultery and separation for a period of two years. The fact that,
since adultery is losing its social stigma, Danes are seeking divorces on the ground
of adultery because it is quicker than the omnibus separation grounds, indicates
the inadvisability of having such omnibus grounds without adequate additional
grounds. The proposed code, however, contains adequate additional grounds.
Id. at 96 (emphasis added).
This conclusion seems incongruous since the additional grounds would have less of a
social stigma than adultery and therefore would presumably be used at least as
frequently as the Dane's use that ground.
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no fault decree could be granted in a contested proceeding since the nonfault divorce ground will be available to either spouse without consent.
The proposed changes in the grounds for divorce a.m.t. are slight.
However, they are significant in that they make the grounds for this remedy
identical to that for divorce a.v.m. While it has been previously noted
that there appears to be no valid reason to retain divorce a.m.t., 158 especially since the Proposed Code adopts alimony for divorce a.v.m., 15 9 the
complete consistancy of the grounds for both actions constitutes an improvement since there would appear to be no valid reason why an act
deemed criminal when committed against a spouse for the purpose of one
remedy would be deemed unimportant for the purposes of the other. This
is especially true since both remedies seek to protect the same societal
interests. Also, the additional use of divorce a.m.t., by the court, as a 6
month delaying tactic 160 where the judge feels reconciliation is possible in
an action for divorce a.v.m., is meritorious and creates a justifiable reason
for its retention, although it is not justifiable when used by individuals as a
means to separate and leave open the possibility of such a reconciliation.' 6 '
B.

Defenses

The primary improvement embodied in the Proposed Code, in addition
to the enactment of a non-fault ground, is the elimination of the two most
invidious defenses: recrimination and the innocent and injured spouse
doctrine. 62 The new definition of the individual grounds for divorce carefully exclude the innocent and injured spouse verbiage. 163 In the comments the drafters state two reason for this change. The first is the recognition of the fact that there are seldom cases in which one spouse is
entirely free from fault. The second is recognition of the common judicial
practice, which is to hold that complete freedom from fault is not essential
under the innocent and injured spouse rationale. 6 4 With the elimination
of these words from the statutory grounds and the specific exclusion of
the defense of recrimination the state's greatest abuse of its discretion is
eliminated. The families most in need of relief will be able to obtain a
158. See p. 166 supra.
159. PROPOSED DIVORCE CODE § 504. For a discussion and critique of these new
provisions see Comment, Permanent Alimony Upon Absolute Divorce - A Necessary
Change in Pennsylvania Law, 15 VILL. L. Rxv. 187, 190-92 (1969).
160. PROPOSED DIVORCE CoDE § 301(2), provides in pertinent part:
(2) In any action of divorce from the bonds of matrimony ... where grounds
for divorce have been established, if the court finds that attempts at reconciliation
are practicable and to the best interests of the family, it may of its own motion
or at the request of either party:
(b)

.'.

. issue a temporary decree of divorce from bed and board for a period

of six months ....

161. See pp. 165-66 supra.
162. PROPOSED DIVORCE CODE § 304.
163. PROPOSED DIVORCE CoDE § 301.
164. This is a variation of the comparative rectitude doctrine where the less guilty
party is allowed to receive a divorce. See, e.g., White v. White, 56 Schuyl. Leg. Reg.
197, affd, 185 Pa. Super. 141, 138 A.2d 162 (1958); Trier v. Trier, 43 Del. Co. R.

244 (1956).
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divorce under fault or non-fault grounds. This would allow the state to
concentrate on reconciling those marriages which retain some characteristics of a functional unit. 165
While the innocent and injured spouse and recrimination doctrines
would be abolished by the proposed Code, the defenses of condonation
and collusion would be retained on a more rational basis. Collusion, which
is presently a defense to all actions for divorce, would, under the Proposed
Code, retain its applicability to all such actions but on a limited basis. It
would be restricted to cases of fabrication of grounds for divorce, perjury,
or fraud.'36 The doctrine of connivance, however, would be expanded
and would now be available both to husband and wife, 167 eliminating an
objectionable feature of this defense.
The final change in the defenses to a divorce proceeding is the limitation of the defense of condonation to those situations where there is a
"willing" forgiveness on the part of the libellant.' 68 This change is made
solely to allow a divorce where there is a renewed cohabitation under
fraud or duress and an act of intercourse transpires. 169 However, as
previously noted, 70 this change does not rectify the problems of subsequent mistreatment by the defendant which falls short of a ground for
divorce and of the libellant who forgave his spouse but could not live
with his forgiveness. In both those cases a divorce would still unjustifiably be denied to a party who is truly injured. While the non-fault ground
might be a means of relief for a libellant in either of these two situations,
the 2 year waiting period would appear to discourage the use of the nonfault ground where fault grounds are available.' 7 ' Therefore, the failure
to investigate the effectiveness of the condonation in allowing the family
to function 7 2 is a shortcoming which could and should have been rectified
by the proposed law. If the fault rationale is to remain, condonation
should be made conditional on the subsequent behavior of the guilty
spouse and should be made revocable by the libellant for psychological
reasons as well as the subsequent conduct of his spouse.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It is entirely conceivable that a system of divorce law which adequately reflects the existent marriage situation and the state's interest is
165. See PROPOSED DIVORCE CODE § 102, for the framer's interpretation of the
interests which the legislation is attempting to protect. This new law recognizes that:
[I]t is in the state's interest to allow termination of a marriage that has
ceased to provide social stability and thereby has failed to fulfill the purposes for
which it was established.
Comment, Divorce Reform - One State's Solution, 1967 DUKE L.J. 956, 960.
166. PROPOSED DrVORC8 CoDE § 406. This section would presumably allow agreements to secure a divorce where legitimate grounds exist.
167. PROPOSED DIVORCE CODE § 304.

168. PROPOSED DIVoRcE CODE § 304.
169. PROPOSED

DIVORCE CODE

§ 304, Comment at 103, which states: "[i]f there is

physical compulsion, or economic necessity, the court may find that despite cohabitation
there was no condonation."
170. See p. 169 supra.
171. PROPOSED DIVORCE CoDE § 301 (1) (c).
172. See note 61 supra.
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impossible to establish. To balance the countervailing interests would
require a delicate hand. It would appear that the ideal system would
demand a simple and dignified divorce procedure together with enough
inherent difficulty to offer the parties an inducement to reconcile their
differences. Only in this way could the individual desires of a spouse be
made compatible with the financial and societal burden placed on the state
by the dissolution of marriage. It appears essential that the grounds must
be such as to eliminate the abuses and perversions of the judicial process
inherent under the present law. 173 The only way to adequately meet these
often conflicting goals may be through a non-fault divorce procedure carried on by a sociological agency comprised of well-trained individuals.
This system would require a 2 year waiting period for divorce with mandatory counseling for families with minor children and/or where both
parties do not consent to the dissolution. Where neither of these factors
are present, counseling should be available but not on a compulsory basis.
It would appear that the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory counseling would be justified by the higher state interest financial and societal - in the former situation. The presence of children
or the lack of consent by one party would appear to require a conscientious
attempt by the state to mediate and end the marital disputes if possible,
while the almost total lack of interest of the state where these factors are
nonexistent would appear to render state intervention arbitrary. The removal of this process from the courts, whose apparatus and procedures are
legalistic rather than sociological and psychological, would seem essential
if any meaningful attempt at reconciliation is to be obtained. Lastly, while
the concept of the breakdown of the marriage should be central to this
system, the final decision as to the breakdown must come from the parties
by mutual consent or by the moving party. This is necessary because a
judgment by an agency that the parties can coexist together exercises no
control over the viability of a marriage.
It can readily be seen that the Proposed Pennsylvania Divorce Code
falls far short of these criteria. However, while the commentators on
divorce reform are almost uniform in urging the adoption of a total nonfault concept of divorce 17 4 such a law has been enacted in only one state.' 7 5
Given the political realities of the situation, 170 the Pennsylvania Proposed
Divorce Code is a meaningful attempt to eradicate the more obvious abuses
of the present system. Its adoption will make the law of the Commonwealth more adequately reflect the social realities of the 1960's.
Robert A. Ebenstein
173. See note 62 supra.
174. See, e.g., Bodenheimer, supra note 62; Freed, supra note 2; Hammer, supra
note 3; Sayre, supra note 113. But see Goddard, The Proposal for Divorce Upon
Petition and Without Fault, 43 J. ST. B. CALIF. 90 (1968).
175. See note 136 supra.
176. Such pressure is indicated by a Gallup Poll showing that a majority of
Americans favor stricter divorce laws. Bodenheimer, supra note 62 n.38, at 187, citing
Gallup Poll (Public Opinion Surveys, Inc., Princeton, N.J.), entitled Public Sets
Grounds For Divorce. See note 145 supra.
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